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The doctrine of claim preclusion promotes fairness andfinality by preventing
partiesfrom raising claims that already were (or could have been) raised in a prior
proceeding. This strict consequence can be imposed only when the litigant received
minimal due process protections in the initialproceeding, including notice and direct
or indirectparticipation.
Modern litigation has caused a new problem. In some cases, a party may be
precludedfrom ever raisinga claim on the grounds of "fictionalconsent" to a prior
court's decisionmakingauthority. Litigation devices have expanded the potentialreach
of judgments through aggregation and broad jurisdictional grants, and certain
environments-such as bankruptcy-require that the parties consent to the initial
court's authority to decide a dispute. Applying claim preclusion to unraised claims in
such environments poses a serious due process threat. Subsequent courts satisfy the
claim preclusion standardby relying on fictional consent, i.e., by presuming that the
litigant would have consented to the court's power to decide the claim if she had
brought the claim in her initialproceeding. But the litigant did not actually bring the
claim, and therefore did not actually consent to the initialcourt's exercise of authority.
This Article is the first to highlight the problem of claim preclusion by fictional
consent. By looking to bankruptcy as a paradigmaticexample, this Article concludes
thatprecluding unraised claims on the basis of fictional consent favors finality at a
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perilous cost to due process. To solve this problem, this Article develops a taxonomy of
claim preclusion scenarios based on different litigation contexts. The taxonomy
neutralizesfictional consent and accounts for due process concerns. Reducing claim
preclusion to ensure due process may give rise to opportunistic litigation tactics. This
Article therefore identifies existing doctrinal tools that courts may use to reduce
wasteful opportunism.
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INTRODUCTION

"Forthe sake of repose, resjudicata shields the fraud and the cheat as
well as the honest person. It therefore is to be invoked only after careful
inquiry."1
Claim preclusion is strong medicine. The doctrine, grounded in
principles of finality, operates as a judge-created bar to duplicative
litigation. In short, it dictates that litigants who had a fair shot to have
their legal issues resolved in a previous proceeding cannot later seek
another bite at the apple in a second proceeding. This simple foundation
has inherent allure. Litigation is relentlessly taxing, and without finality
doctrines such as claim preclusion there would be little to prevent
advocates from advancing their client's interests over and over in
different forums until they are successful (or the litigation budget runs

dry).

Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979). "Because res judicata may govern grounds and
defenses not previously litigated, however, it blockades unexplored paths that may lead to truth."

Id.
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But the doctrine's focus on discouraging repetitive litigation has a
critical counterbalance: the party facing preclusion must have had
sufficient opportunity for the first forum to hear its claim. If not, the
preclusive bar unjustly silences litigants, undercutting its fundamental
focus on fairness and violating due process protections. The various tests
for applying claim preclusion all touch on this "sufficiency" question,
seeking to preclude only those claims that received a sufficient
opportunity to be heard in a prior proceeding.
As with many equitable doctrines, decisionmakers' application of
claim preclusion at the margins has developed in complicated and
imperfect ways. After hundreds of years, the straightforward case of claim
preclusion is just that-straightforward. But in complex modern
structures, the application of claim preclusion is neither consistent nor
predictable due to two primary factors. First, nontraditional collective
litigation proceedings do not fit neatly within the elements of claim
preclusion, making the analysis vulnerable to strained application.
Second, pragmatic concerns, such as the potentially massive cost of repeat
litigation, are amplified in collective environments. Where a court is
asked to stretch claim preclusion doctrine to fit modern molds, while also
being warned about the doomsday effect that preclusion avoids in those
contexts, there is no surprise that the outcome leans toward functionalist
expansion. Expanding claim preclusion in this way may indeed protect
finality in environments where it is most critical. The cost, however, is
that some categories of claimants will be stripped of their day in court in
ways that violate the bedrock principle of fundamental fairness.
This Article focuses on one such functionalist expansion: preclusion
of unraised claims that could only have been heard in the initial
proceeding with litigant consent. Claim preclusion requires a court of
competent jurisdiction to decide the initial claim. In some contexts,
courts have the power to decide a claim only if the parties consent (this
Article will refer to such claims as "consent claims"). Where consent
claims are not raised in the first proceeding, subsequent courts must
grapple with a legal fiction: absent any indication of consent with regards
to the claim at issue, should preclusion apply? Was the first proceeding
before a court of "competent jurisdiction" where the claim "should have
been raised"? These questions have real consequences, both for the
individual litigants who are precluded and for the overall systems in
which they arise.
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Understanding the role of consent in claim preclusion doctrine
requires a clear distinction between actual consent and fictional consent.
Actual consent, as used in this Article, means some indication through
words or actions that the party consented to have the initial court decide
his claim. Fictional consent, by contrast, describes a backward-looking
presumption about what the party is deemed to have consented to for
purposes of claim preclusion. When the parties actually consent 2 to a
court hearing their consent claim, the resulting decision may have
preclusive effect. Conversely, where actual consent to jurisdiction is
altogether absent from the initial proceeding, claim preclusion does not

apply.
In today's litigation landscape, however, a court's authority to decide
claims is not an all or nothing proposition. Fictional consent arises when
the parties were properly before the court for some claims but did not
raise other claims that would have required party consent. Subsequent
courts correctly acknowledge that the first court's jurisdiction over the
unraised claim relied upon the party's consent, but then presume that
consent existed for purposes of claim preclusion. This creates a
problematic legal fiction, because nobody knows whether the party in the
first proceeding actually would have consented.3
The problem of fictional consent in claim preclusion lies at the nexus
of many fields of law, requiring consideration of jurisdiction and
authority, due process, and consent. For this reason, scholars of
procedure, federal courts, and constitutional law have each touched on
different threads of the conversation. For example, Professor Alan
Trammell highlights the role that autonomy and participation play in
testing claim preclusion's due process limits.4 Professor Howard
Erichson's scholarship identifies tension points in claim preclusion
doctrine that center on jurisdictional matters,5 and identifies the role of

2 Section I.B offers a deeper explanation of the difference between actual and fictional consent,
especially as compared to other concepts of consent in the law (such as "implied" and "constructive"
consent).
3

Indeed, as explained in Section ILB, parties might have had reason and motivation to

withhold consent, had the issue been actually before the initial court.
4 Alan M. Trammell, Precedent and Preclusion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565, 568 (2018)
[hereinafter Trammell, Precedentand Preclusion];Alan M. Trammell, TransactionalismCosts, 100
VA. L. REV. 1211, 1239-40 (2014) [hereinafter Trammell, TransactionalismCosts].
5 Howard M. Erichson, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 980-81 (1998)

(exploring contexts where jurisdictional elements impact claim preclusion).
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consent in preclusion doctrine.6 Professor Kevin Clermont contributes to
the debate through multiple works, and grapples at length with the
balance between fairness and finality that honors claim preclusion while
satisfying due process.7 Many procedural scholars have explored due
process concerns that arise when preclusive effect attaches to certain
forms of aggregate litigation.8 Absent from the dialogue to date is a
discussion of the larger threat fictional consent poses to due process and

the departure its use represents from both traditional and modern tenets
of preclusion. This Article broadens the debate by identifying fictional
consent 9 and how it problematically manifests in modern litigation
structures. By drawing lessons from bankruptcy, this Article highlights
circumstances where the due process threat is most acute and proposes a
solution that can restrain overexpansion of claim preclusion doctrine.

To better understand the broader problem, consider the way
fictional consent arises in the bankruptcy context. Bankruptcy court
jurisdiction is expansive, and includes all matters that are "related to" the

debtor's estate. This includes both creditors' claims against the debtor and
claims between different creditors. Although bankruptcy courts may hear
a wide variety of suits, they may not finally decide many claims without
the parties' consent due to statutory 0 and/or constitutionallI limitations.

6

Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REv.

265, 299-301 (2011).
7

See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata as Requisite for Justice, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REv.

1067, 1069 (2016).
8 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class
Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1057 (2002) (arguing for a tailored preclusive effect premised
upon the level of due process that was afforded absent claimants); Tobias Barrington Wolff,

Preclusionin ClassAction Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 717, 764-65 (2005) (highlighting ways in
which courts are either avoiding or incorrectly addressing the preclusive effect of their decisions
and urging greater focus on preclusion at the certification stage by imposing "prospective
imposition of constraints upon the preclusive effect of class judgments"); Debra Lyn Bassett, Just
Go Away: Representation, Due Process, and Preclusion in Class Actions, 2009 BYU L. REv. 1079

(2009).
9 The concept of fictional consent has been mentioned by other scholars under different
names, albeit in less detail. See discussion infra note 39.
i

Noncore claims are set forth in 28 U.S.C.§ 157(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.

11 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482 (2011) (identifying that some claims which were
considered "core" under the Bankruptcy Code could not constitutionally be heard by non-Article
III courts). The phrase "Stern claims" was adopted by practitioners and commentators in the
aftermath of Stern v. Marshall, and the Supreme Court embraced it in Executive Benefits Insurance

Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 34-35 (2014).
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In practice, creditors usually consent to the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction when raising or defending consent claims.12However, many
creditors do not fully grasp the broad range of claims that a bankruptcy
judge may hear. 13 These litigants do not consider whether to raise their
consent claims, let alone evaluate whether they should agree to the
bankruptcy court's ability to finally decide those claims. Fictional consent
arises in this scenario when a creditor brings its consent claim against
another creditor in a later lawsuit, only to face a claim preclusion defense.
The bankruptcy court could have decided the claim, but only with both
parties' consent.
Courts are split about how to interpret consent claims that were
never raised in a prior bankruptcy case for claim preclusion purposes. A
minority of courts conclude that, absent party consent, the bankruptcy
court was not a court of "competent jurisdiction" for purposes of claim
preclusion with regard to unraised consent claims. Other courts are
dismissive of the authority issue and give claim preclusive effect to
unraised claims that a bankruptcy court could have heard with party
consent. From the majority perspective, both parties likely would have
consented to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction had the claim been
raised, and, even if the party withheld consent, the bankruptcy court
would simply issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to
the district court. 14 To these courts, denying preclusive effect for such
claims would improperly place form over function.
I agree that drawing a formalistic line on consent-based jurisdiction
has functional consequences, and that rejecting claim preclusion on the
basis of fictional consent would permit more claims to proceed. I also
recognize that finality is particularly important in collective litigation
scenarios. Yet, form matters, even when-especially when-the costs are
high. In the case of bankruptcy, a creditor bringing a state-law claim that
threatens the entire treatment of a previously resolved bankruptcy estate

iz

Whether the creditor should be considered a "party" to all parts of the bankruptcy case for

claim preclusion purposes is a separate question that I address in Part II below.
13

For example, a creditor who files a proof of claim seeking repayment of a loan made to the

debtor is unlikely to know that, with consent, the bankruptcy court could have jurisdiction to finally
decide his state law contract claim against another of the debtor's creditors. See infra Section II.C.1
for a hypothetical example of how these seemingly unrelated noncore claims could arise.
14

These courts insert further confusion by looking at the issue from the defendant's

perspective; in most fictional consent cases, it is the plaintiff who did not consent to jurisdiction in
the initial proceeding, which is usually given by raising a claim.
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could cause disastrous results. But Congress designed the Bankruptcy
Code with an eye toward limited authority, and the Supreme Court's line
of bankruptcy jurisdiction cases further emphasize the constitutional
limits on what a bankruptcy court may decide. Sweeping aside these

considerations in pursuit of finality and repose is both misguided and
unnecessary. 1
Extending claim preclusion doctrine through fictional consent is
inconsistent with its origins. This Article's first Section offers a brief
history of claim preclusion and its underlying purposes and then
introduces the Supreme Court's recognition of due process requirements
for preclusion to apply, focusing on the "day in court" ideal that
commentators tie to a participatory theory of due process.
This Article next explores the role of consent and how claim
preclusion is applied to consent claims in various contexts. In most
situations, there is no dispute over whether there was a court of
competent jurisdiction for claim preclusion purposes. 16 For example,
parties must clearly consent to a federal magistrate judge's jurisdiction
over all claims before decisions on such claims are given preclusive effect.
And parties appearing before an administrative agency affirmatively
consent to their jurisdiction to decide even tangential claims. Why would
claims in bankruptcy be treated differently? This Article concludes that
the doctrine of claim preclusion should not turn on fictional consent
where due process threats are high.
This Article's final Section recognizes that claim preclusion by
fictional consent may arise differently, and require different solutions,
depending upon the litigation environment. It creates a new taxonomy
for courts to readjust the claim preclusion standard for unraised consent
claims, asking them to evaluate two key indicators of due process threatbreadth of jurisdiction and litigant awareness. This Article then identifies

is

See infra Part III (outlining alternatives to preclusion that may remedy many of the concerns

that encourage expansion of the preclusion doctrine).
16

In commercial arbitration, for example, companies negotiate and consent to the scope of an

arbitrator's authority in their private contract. If claims between the companies fall within the
arbitration clause, then the arbitrator's decision can have claim preclusive effect. In contrast, where
a company's claim is beyond the scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, that company may raise it in
another proceeding without fear of being barred. The consent, or lack thereof, is directly correlated
with whether claim preclusion applies. Of course, the company could have consented to the
arbitrator's authority over other claims, but-unlike in bankruptcy-no court would assume that
consent would have been given. See infra Section I.C.2.
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specific challenges that would result from the proposed application and
suggests a number of alternative measures to minimize the impact of
increased proceedings. By highlighting ways to achieve the same finality
incentives through other means, this Article makes the case for realigning
the role that claim preclusion plays in modern litigation.
I.

CONSENT AND CLAIM PRECLUSION

Claim preclusion has a rich history and strong establishment in
American legal institutions. Commentators and courts alike have
evaluated the varying approaches to claim preclusion, traced the

doctrine's origin, and outlined its underlying motivations. Missing from
that conversation, so far, is the fundamental problem that surfaces when
unraised claims collide with the necessity of consent. This Part introduces
the claim preclusion doctrine. It then examines the role that consent plays
in claim preclusion and identifies a specific threat to the delicate balance
between finality and fairness-fictional consent.

A.

FoundationalPrinciplesof Claim Preclusion

Claim preclusion, also known as res judicata, is a finality doctrine
that protects litigants from duplicative litigation.17 Res judicata, roughly
translated from Latin as "a thing decided," traces back centuries to the
earliest systems of societal dispute resolution.I8 Roman treatises
described res judicata as originating from a policy of protecting litigants
in private disputes from ongoing challenges, noting that the doctrine
creates law between parties.19 Finality was the core motivation, as "it is in

1

See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 (3d ed. 2020). Other forms of estoppel, including collateral and
direct estoppel, arose later, which in modern times are called "issue preclusion." Since the
Restatement clarified its terminology to reduce confusion, "res judicata" became synonymous with
both claim and issue preclusion. For simplicity, I use claim preclusion throughout this Article.
is See ALLAN D. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-17-18 (Matthew Bender, 1969).
19

Robert Wyness Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and

Anglo-American Law, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1, 6 (1940) (discussing the maxim res judicatafacitjus inter

partes).
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the interest of the State that there be an end to litigation."20 Since the
doctrine's inception, different legal systems throughout the world have
incorporated the basic principles of claim preclusion into various forms
and under various names. This includes the English common law

tradition from which our United States system developed.21
The modern "transactional" approach22 to claim preclusion bars
claims where (1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision
was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties or their

privies to be bound are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of
action is involved in both cases. 23 Where the elements are met, claim
preclusion will bar litigants from bringing all claims arising out of the
same transaction in a later proceeding.24 Claim preclusion is an
affirmative defense that must be raised by a party, otherwise it will be
waived. The arbiter of the second proceeding evaluates claim preclusion
by applying the law of the jurisdiction where the initial case was decided. 25
For example, if the initial decision was rendered in a bankruptcy court,
the second reviewing court would apply the claim preclusion law of the

20 Clermont, supra note 7, at 1069 (pointing to the phrase "interest reipublicae ut sit finis

litium").
21

See Clermont, supra note 7, at 1072-73 (describing the development and progression of

claim preclusion in England).
2

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (providing the

general standards used to evaluate claim preclusive effect). Some courts use a slightly different
standard, which evaluates (1) a final decision on the merits, (2) between the same parties, (3) in
which the plaintiff litigated or should have litigated the same issue, (4) involving the same cause of

action. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748-49 (2001); Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517
U.S. 793, 798 (1996); Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521, 529 (6th Cir. 2006).
23 Although the core principles are consistent, claim preclusion doctrine has many distinctions

in different forums. The claim preclusive effect of an earlier adjudication is "discussed in varying
and, at times, seemingly conflicting terminology." Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465

U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984).
24 The United States' modern approach to claim preclusion is both strict and expansive relative

to other legal systems. See Clermont, supra note 7, at 1073 (observing the United States' expansive
view of claim preclusion relative to other nations).
25 See Midway Motor Lodge v. Innkeepers' Telemanagement & Equip. Corp., 54 F.3d 406, 409

(7th Cir. 1995) ("In the law of preclusion ...

the court rendering the first judgment does not get to

determine that judgment's effect; the second court is entitled to make its own decision .... ");

Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2008) ("It is the duty of
the second trial court-which knows both what the earlier finding was and how it relates to a later
case-to independently determine what preclusive effect a prior judgment may be given.").
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federal circuit in which the bankruptcy judge heard the case to determine
whether claim preclusion applies.26
Although claim preclusion doctrine primarily addresses individuals'
private interest in finality, the aggregation of those interests expands to
the point that the need for finality becomes a public benefit.27 Finality is
one of the fundamental values underpinning the civil litigation system.
Bringing parties' disputes before the nation's courts and other arbitral
bodies requires significant monetary and personal resources. To justify
such expenses, the parties must trust the system to decide the outcome of
their disputes. The finality of an arbiter's decision is one element that
provides legitimacy to, and encourages trust in, litigation systems. The
basic concept of finality in litigation provides reassurance that, once a
dispute is resolved, a party will not have to re-litigate that same dispute

again. Myriad standards, procedural rules, laws, and equitable doctrines
weave together to create the fabric of finality, which blankets courts and
proceedings across forums. Parties rely upon finality when they seek
resolution of their disputes. Without finality, the investment of resources
that litigation requires would increase to all sides. Courts would be
further burdened by litigants who have the means to continue bringing
claims until they get a desired result. Eventually, without the check of
finality, litigation would become unpredictable, unreliable, and
ultimately disfavored among businesses and individuals alike.
Although finality is critical to a functioning system of dispute
resolution, finding the appropriate scope requires careful consideration
of the interests and claims that are being excluded. The contours of
finality doctrines are intentionally created to prevent some claims from
being raised. This motivates litigants to bring their claims at the
appropriate time and removes strategic incentives for gamesmanship. But
the balance must not overshadow a related core litigation value: the
litigant's due process right to freely test claims and to stand and be heard
on those claims before an arbiter. Woven improperly, finality doctrines

26 The choice of law analysis in claim preclusion is both nuanced and interesting, but for
purposes of this Article-which primarily focuses on the claim preclusive effect of bankruptcy court
&

decisions-the applicable law is federal common law of claim preclusion. See ROBERT C. CASAD

KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE
213-26 (Carolina Academic Press, 2001). But see Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and
Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 720 (1984) (noting that a "transferee
court is fully competent to decide issues of federal law").
27

Allan D. Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29, 31 (1964).
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can silence litigants in a way that also threatens a system's legitimacy.28
Unraveling and re-evaluating the balance between competing interests of
fairness and finality in claim preclusion doctrine presents an ongoing
challenge.
One critical feature of claim preclusion doctrine is that it bars not
only claims that were actually raised between the parties but also those
that could have been raised. Unraised claims fall at the tension point
between finality and fairness. The tension is acute on unraised claims
because claim preclusion "blockades unexplored paths that may lead to
truth."29 While precluding unraised claims may not seem "fair" in a
colloquial sense, 30 the critical legal inquiry is whether it violates a party's
constitutional right to a day in court. Assuming a party raised her claim
in the first proceeding, few would argue that finality does not align with
fairness considerations in support of claim preclusive effect. When the
party does not raise their claim in proceeding one, however, finality and
fairness in favor of the party who raises the claim preclusion defense in
the second proceeding collide with interests of fairness to the party who
will be barred from ever having his day in court on a potentially
meritorious claim. Because an unraised claim, if precluded, will never
truly have a day in court, due process requires a careful review of whether
the missed opportunity in proceeding one was sufficient.
The Due Process Clause31 protects litigants' ability to litigate issues
depriving their life, liberty, or property rights by setting minimum

28

This expands beyond the general perception of whether a particular dispute resolution

process is legitimate. When claim preclusion attaches to unraised claims in a distant initial forum
(such as pure state law claims in a bankruptcy court), the subsequent forum is doubly harmed by
(1) developing problematic claim preclusion precedent and (2) losing the opportunity to develop
its precedent regarding the precluded claim.
29

Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979).

30

In fact, whether the doctrine leads to unjust results should have no bearing on the analysis.

Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("The district court,
however, correctly recognized that there is no 'change of law' or fairness exception to prevent
application of claim preclusion."). But see Trammell, Transactionalism Costs, supra note 4
(explaining judges' "tenderness towards defeated litigants" that results in narrowly applying the
standard to evade preclusion).
31

See U.S. CONST. amend. V (Due Process Clause applicable to federal government requires

that "[n]o person shall be ...

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); id.

amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause applicable to states provides that "[n]o State shall .... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law").
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procedural requirements. 32 The Supreme Court's interpretation of due
process protection requires, at minimum, notice of the proceeding and

an opportunity to be heard,33 and will be analyzed by balancing the
relevant interests at stake.34 If such protections were provided, then
litigants' initial failure to pursue their claims does not permit a second
bite at the apple. In Taylor v. Sturgell, the Supreme Court revisited the
intersection of due process and claim preclusion, and firmly reinforced
the right to directly or indirectly participate in a proceeding.35 It is these
rights that form the basis of the "fairness" counterbalance in claim
preclusion analysis. Scholars evaluating this issue note the individualized,
participatory nature of procedural due process rights.36 The next Section

32

See William V. Luneburg, The Opportunity to Be Heard and the Doctrines of Preclusion:

Federal Limits on State Law, 31 VILL. L. REV. 81 (1986); Max Minzner, Saving Stare Decisis:
Preclusion, Precedent, and Procedural Due Process, 2010 BYU L. REV. 597, 633 (identifying
procedural due process limitations on preclusion); Trammell, Precedentand Preclusion,supra note
4, at 597 ("[I]n the preclusion context, the Supreme Court has always regarded participation as
intrinsically valuable, and that is the quintessence of a participation-based theory of due process.");
see also Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, andDistortion, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 475, 510 ("[T]he control of one's own litigation cannot be regarded as a small detail within
the overall scheme of civil procedure.").
33 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Many controversies

have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no
doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."). The
Supreme Court explained that "the right to be heard ensured by the guarantee of due process 'has
little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."' Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 799

(1996) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
34

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

35

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due

Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1035 (2003) (noting a common theme in preclusion doctrine of
evaluating whether the litigant received their "day in court"). The Taylor Court pushed back against
the notion that a nonparty will always be precluded by a previous action where the initial suit
included a party who "adequately represented" the nonparty, instead allowing nonparty preclusion
on that basis only in "certain limited circumstances." Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 894. Due process
challenges to preclusion are often based upon the lack of direct representation. Bassett, supra note
8, at 1113 ("In terms of due process, in terms of ensuring one's 'day in court,' in terms of
fundamental fairness, and in terms of representation in litigation, preclusion in the class action
context consistently comes up short. For unnamed class members, every purported due process
protection is a substituted or constructive form of due process rather than a direct protection.").
36

See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court"Ideal andNonparty Preclusion,67 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 193, 204-05 (1992). Other scholars accept that due process is satisfied when the litigant's
interests are adequately represented, even if they did not have a meaningful opportunity to
participate. This perspective is understandable when the representative actually raised the claim in
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evaluates the role that consent plays in claim preclusion and looks at the
impact that consent may have on litigants' participatory due process
rights.

B.

Consent and Claim Preclusion
1.

Framing Consent

Before examining the ways that consent impacts claim preclusion, it
is necessary to set out the types of consent that will be discussed
throughout this Article and distinguish them from various other forms
or conceptions of consent. From criminal statutes to contract
interpretation, consent plays a significant role in other corners of the law,

and many conversations about consent turn on similar underlying
concerns.3 7 Scholarship on consent offers a variety of ways to name,
structure, and conceptualize consent in different contexts, all of which
form the foundation for this Article's particular use. 38

an initial proceeding. If, however, the claim by a representative was never raised, the question
remains whether the absent party was adequately represented if the foreclosed claim should have
been raised in the initial proceeding. See David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After
Stephenson: A Rawlsian/BehavioralEconomics Approach to ClassAction Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J.
279, 280-83 (2006) ("More generally, fundamental principles of fairness dictate that class members
be held to settlements only if the relief provided to them by the settlement is something that a
person conceivably could have accepted, before knowing her exact position within the class, in
return for ceding for all time her legal claims for redress.") (emphasis added).
37

See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability:An

Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1110 (2006) (providing empirical
analysis of unconscionability claims to contract enforcement through the lens of a "consent theory"
of application); Nancy S. Kim, Relative Consent and ContractLaw, 18 NEV. L.J. 165, 168 (2017)
(describing the role of consent in various elements of contract law); Alex B. Long, The Forgotten
Role of Consent in Defamation and Employment Reference Cases, 66 FLA. L. REV. 719, 721-23 (2014)
(highlighting the impact of consent in the context of defamation suits against employers); Andrew
T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA.

J. INT'L L.

747 (2012) (calling for reevaluation of the role of

state consent in international law proceedings).
38

See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 121 (Harvard University Press, 1971) (exploring

the concept of hypothetical consent); Frank Lovett, Should Justice Be Based on Consent?, 12

J. POL.

PHIL. 79, 87-89 (2004) (challenging the role that consent plays in a procedurally oriented system
and categorizing different forms of consent); PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE
DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 284
(Routledge, 2017); Tobias Barrington Wolff, FederalJurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the

Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2083-86 (2008) [hereinafter Wolff, Federal
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Here, the consent at issue falls into one of two distinct categories:

actual consent and fictional consent.39 Actual consent is defined by an ex
ante action that indicates the party's intent to consent. Actual consent
may be express, through words, or implied, by the party's actions. In
either case, the key consideration to evaluate actual consent is whether it
was knowing and voluntary. 40 If not, the consent is not valid, and should
not bind the litigant. In practice, reliance on actual consent may pose due
process problems, especially in instances where the "consent" is
determined by statute to apply but the party has little meaningful
opportunity to withhold the consent. 41 At bottom, courts evaluating
actual consent are doing so by looking to identifiable words or actions.
In contrast, I define fictional consent as an automatic assumption
placed upon a litigant ex post about what the litigant would have

consented to under the objective circumstances. It does not turn on any

Jurisdiction and Due Process] (describing three different theories of consent the Supreme Court
deploys in their discussion of jurisdiction); Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for
Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (2012) (noting concerns with litigant consent
in aggregate litigation).
39

Other commentators have identified the same dichotomy between actual and fictional

consent, although the latter concept has not been consistently identified by any single name. See

Debra Lyn Bassett, Class Action Silence, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1781, 1799, 1804 (2014) (describing the
difference between actual consent and what she calls "fictitious" consent in class actions); Wolff,
Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process, supra note 38, at 2092 (explaining the Supreme Court's
decision in Shutts as mischaracterizing "constructive" consent as simple consent); WESTEN, supra
note 38, at 8 (describing "hypothetical" consent in the medical context).
4o See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1948 (2015) (consent requires a

party's "knowing and voluntary" consent and such consent may be express or implied by "actions
rather than words"); Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 590 (2003) (permitting implied consent after
indication of awareness and knowledge of the implication of appearing in court); Consent, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining "consent" as "agreement, approval, or permission
regarding some act or purpose, esp[ecially] given voluntarily by a competent person; legally
effective assent").
41

For example, corporations may be deemed to consent to general personal jurisdiction

pursuant to mandatory registration statutes in many states. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,

814 F.3d 619, 641 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting, but declining to address, potential Due Process Clause
issues that arise when state registration statutes create general personal jurisdiction); Tanya

J.

Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacyof Consent, 36 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1343, 1352, 1379 (2015) (concluding that coerced consent through mandatory statutes should
not subject a corporation to general personal jurisdiction). Similarly, the October 3, 2018, AntiTerrorism Clarification Act (ATCA) expressly classifies a number of actions-including, for
example, accepting aid from the United States-as indicative of "consent" to personal jurisdiction.

See Pub. L. No. 115-253, § 4, 132 Stat. 3183, 3184 (2018) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2334
(2018)).
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specific factors about the individual litigant's autonomous decision.42
This is fundamentally at odds with the normal understanding of consent,
and in tension with the individualized theory of due process rights.
2.

Impact of Consent on the Elements of Claim Preclusion

Claim preclusion prevents parties who have already had their day in

court from later bringing claims that were not raised. As described above,
the doctrine's reach to unraised claims motivates litigants to bring all
possible claims in the initial proceeding. But not all categories of unraised
claims were automatically possible to bring in the first case. For many
claims, the litigant's consent is required ("consent claims"). Here, the
relevant analysis is whether a party consented in a previous proceeding to

a court's ability to decide his dispute. If the party did not consent, then
the party's failure to bring the consent claim in the first proceeding has
no claim preclusive effect. If, however, the second court finds that the
party did consent, then that party may be precluded from raising the
consent claim.43 Consent may be at issue in a number of claim preclusion
elements, including consent that the initial court is one of "competent
jurisdiction" and/or consent that the court may "finally decide" issues
before it.4 Without actual consent, however, preclusion of unraised
consent claims presents a troublesome fiction. Courts applying claim
preclusion to these claims must conclude that the party would have
consented to jurisdiction over the claim if it had been raised in the initial
proceeding.
In the case of jurisdiction, courts and commentators evaluate at
great length whether consent is sufficient to waive a core constitutional

42 Sample instances of fictional consent in the law include analysis into removal of life support
and affirming emergency medical intervention. In either case, the decision turns on what someone
in the person's position would have agreed to had they been in the position to consent. Their
consent is fictional because they are not able to actually consent. See WESTEN, supra note 38, at 287
(discussing these examples under the title of "hypothetical consent").
43 As explained above, this Article analyzes claim preclusion as a means to bar unraised claims
that require litigant consent. The claims that are barred in the second proceeding could only have
been heard if the party being precluded gave its consent.
44 As will be relevant in the discussion of consent jurisdiction in bankruptcy, competent
jurisdiction has been interpreted by most courts to mean it can actually decide the claim and offer
relief, not simply hear the case. See Jurisdiction, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(defining "competent jurisdiction" as "having power to decide a case").
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protection of having disputes heard in a certain forum. 45 Their analysis is
most probing in litigation contexts where the legal consequences of
consent threaten due process and systemic integrity. This includes
instances when Article III review is prevented in favor of Article I courts,
when Article I courts supersede state court determinations on state law
issues, and when claimants are tied to a distant aggregated proceeding
without direct representation.46 Issues surrounding consent as the
foundation for a court's jurisdiction are already complicated when
discussed with regard to an initial proceeding. Whether that same
consent is sufficient to preclude collateral review is an even thornier topic,
especially when the consent was not actually given because the claim was
never raised. In the claim preclusion context, applying the fiction of
consent to unraised claims layers the harsh consequence of silencing a
litigant's right to raise a claim on top of these well-trodden concerns
about meaningful consent to jurisdiction. The following Section provides
examples where claim preclusion applies to unraised claims based upon
the litigant's actual consent to contrast with claims that are precluded on
the basis of fictional consent.
C.

Actual Consent in Claim Preclusion

Affording claim preclusive effect to unraised claims relies upon the
initial decisionmaker's underlying ability to decide the claim if it had been

raised. In some litigation environments, the arbiters' ability to do so turns
on litigant consent. This Section focuses on instances where parties give
actual consent to the arbiter's decision making power.4 7 By giving

45 Specifically, instances where a party may consent to a court's jurisdiction in a way that waives

constitutional protections, such as in bankruptcy and before magistrate judges. See Bankruptcy

Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. 1, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 333
(effective July 10, 1984) (establishing bankruptcy consent jurisdiction); Federal Magistrate Act of

1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643 (effective Oct. 10, 1979) (adding consent provisions for
magistrates).
46

See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to Jurisdiction Outside the Article III Courts, 71

VAND. L. REv. 715, 718-19 (2018) (exploring the concept of jurisdiction by consent and arguing
that parties should not be able to proceed in Article I bodies where Article III review is
constitutionally required).
47

Whether the actual consent in any individual case is sufficient to be meaningful and not itself

a legal fiction is a separate question that is worth separate analysis. This Article focuses on a greater
evil: instances where there is no fig leaf of consent to the court to decide unraised claims.
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affirmative and advance consent to the arbiter's jurisdiction over a certain
category of claims, there is no concern that the parties would have refused
consent over the unraised claim and application of claim preclusion poses
little due process threat.
1.

Consent and Magistrate Judges

The most straight-forward instance where the claim preclusive effect
of unraised claim turns on actual consent is for proceedings before a
magistrate judge. By design, magistrate judges are adjuncts to Article III
judges, and are given judicial power only by designation of the district
court. 48 The findings of fact and conclusions of law made by magistrates
are subject to de novo review in the Article III courts, remedying
constitutional challenges to their resolution of private rights. Where the
parties give affirmative consent, the magistrate judge's ruling may be
final.49 These consent-based final determinations may have claim
preclusive effect in future proceedings. Because consent to a magistrate
judge's ability to finally decide claims automatically extends to all matters

that the district court has jurisdiction to decide, there is no concern about
fictional consent. Stated another way, a party must affirmatively consent
to all claims in proceeding one in order for any claim in that proceeding
to have preclusive effect.

48

Magistrate Judges Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of

MagistrateJudge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247, 252 (1993) ("[T]he Court has not decided whether the
authority of magistrate judges to preside over civil trials with the consent of the parties pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c) is permissible under Article III of the Constitution.").
49 See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 935-36 (1991) (concluding that a defendant's
consent would constitutionally permit a magistrate judge to oversee a felony trial voir dire process);
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989) (holding that consent is required). The constitutional
protection of Article III arises out of both structural and individual concerns. The Supreme Court
has held that individual constitutional deprivations are waivable, so long as doing so does not
undermine the broader structural limitations designed to protect the separation of powers. See

Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1986); see also infra Part II
(describing similar logic as applied to bankruptcy courts). By giving consent, the individual parties
release their ability to challenge constitutional deprivation of Article III review.
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Consent and Arbitration

Arbitration is a second environment where claim preclusive effect is
based upon actual, rather than fictional, consent.50 The scope of an
arbitrator's power to decide issues turns on the parties' consent,51 usually
manifested in the form of ex ante provisions in a private contract.5 2

Arbitration agreements may be incredibly broad, or instead carefully
drawn to limit arbitration to specific categories of claims.33 Because the
parties actually consent to the scope of issues before the arbitratormeaning there is evidence that the parties intended to grant the
arbitrator's authority-there is no risk of claim preclusion by fictional
consent. 54 To be sure, arbitration clauses present many other potential
injustices, including the absence of meaningful consent associated with
mandatory arbitration provisions and the likelihood that a party's
consent to arbitrate will be knowing and voluntary but will misapprehend

5o

See Anthony G. Buzbee, When Arbitrable ClaimsAre Mixed with NonarbitrableOnes: What's

a Court to Do?, 39 S. TEx. L. REv. 663, 670 (1998); G. Richard Shell, Res Judicataand Collateral
Estoppel Effects of CommercialArbitration, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623, 628 (1988). Arbitration orders,
alone, are not claim preclusive, but the order affirming them can be, if challenged. An interesting,
but out of scope, challenge arises when the parties in a later proceeding question whether claim
preclusion bars only the claims that could have been raised in the arbitration, or instead also those
claims that could have been raised in the proceeding to confirm the judgment.
51

Wolf v. Gruntal & Co., 45 F.3d 524, 528 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting, as the basis for limiting the

claim preclusive effect of arbitral awards, that "the authority of an arbitrator to decide a controversy
is derived entirely from the consent of the parties").
52

Id. (observing that arbitrators' authority is usually "predetermined by contract"); see also

Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468,479 (1989) (due to the private nature of arbitration,
parties are entitled to create their own boundaries via contract). Unlike magistrate judges, arbiters'
power is not jurisdictional per se; rather, it is a creation of contract between the parties. However,
the example is analogous in ways that can inform the analysis and role of actual, voluntary consent
for claim preclusion purposes.
53

See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity,

Arbitrability, and PreclusionPrinciples, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 49, 57 n.31 (2003) (describing arbitration
agreement language that limits the scope of jurisdiction); see also Lagatree v. Luce, Forward,

Hamilton & Scripps, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 669 (Ct. App. 1999) (arbitration clause only reached
common law contract and tort claims, and expressly excluded statutory claims); Davis v. Schwartz,

155 U.S. 631, 637 (1895) (explaining that the degree of judicial deference depends on the scope of
consent); In re Kaplan, 143 F.3d 807, 815 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Generally applicable res judicata rules
must sometimes be adapted to fit the arbitration context.").
54 The same could be said of jurisdiction provisions in contracts that constitute a party's

consent to personal jurisdiction in a forum.
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the scope of claims that will be before the arbitrator. 55 But for purposes of
this Article there is a critical difference between some knowing and
voluntary action-however problematic that action may be-and a
complete absence of action. Arbitration escapes fictional consent because
the parties actually consented to the arbitrator's authority over every

claim that it decides.56
3.

Consent and Article 1 Administrative Proceedings

Administrative adjudicatory proceedings present another litigation
environment that may rely upon litigant consent for its ability to hear
claims. Claim preclusion applies to agency adjudications, 5 which do not

provide blanket jurisdiction.

Based on a number of procedural

safeguards, individuals who are parties to agency proceedings are
commonly required to expressly consent to the agency's jurisdiction over

55 This is compounded by the Supreme Court's presumption in favor of arbitration. See Moses

H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) ("The Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."); AT&T
v. Comm. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (noting that the strong presumption in favor
of arbitrability must be rebutted by "positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute").
56 Furthermore, the parties can agree in the arbitration agreement to limit the preclusive effect

of arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25; Comm. Workers, 475 U.S. at 650.
57

Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1991). Claim preclusion

may be applied with more flexibility before administrative agency courts. See Maldonado v. U.S.

Att'y Gen., 664 F.3d 1369, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that claim preclusion "applies even
more flexibly in the administrative context than it does when a second court of competent
jurisdiction is reviewing the decision of a first court"); Alvear-Velez v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 672, 677
(7th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e have applied res judicata much more flexibly in the administrative

context."); Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 229 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (Shedd, J.,
dissenting); Quinones Candelario v. Postmaster Gen., 906 F.2d 798, 801 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]n the
context of administrative proceedings, res judicatais not automatically and rigidly applied in the

face of contrary public policy."); Facchiano v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 859 F.2d 1163, 1167 (3d Cir.
1988) ("[A]dministrative preclusion... is not as rigidly enforced as preclusion in judicial

proceedings."); Artukovic v. INS, 693 F.2d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[I]n the administrative law
context ... res judicata [is] applied flexibly."); Parker v. Califano, 644 F.2d 1199, 1202 (6th Cir.
1981) ("[A] dministrative res judicata ...

is applied with less rigidity than its judicial counterpart.");

United States v. Smith, 482 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973); Cartier v. Sec'y of State, 506 F.2d 191,
196 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[T]he doctrine of administrative res judicata ...
system that is to be blindly applied in every context.").

has not evolved into a rigid

2020]

THE PROBLEM OF FICTIONAL CONSENT

2581

their claims (even claims that maybe distant from the agency's regulatory
function, such as a constitutional challenge within an enforcement

proceeding).58 By obtaining broad and direct litigant consent, the
decisionmaker in proceeding one leaves no doubt that it was able to
decide the claims before it.59 With actual consent, there are no
unanswered questions about whether the application of claim preclusion

leads to an imbalance between repose and representation, finality and
fairness.60

D.

Fictional Consent in Claim Preclusion

In contrast to the scenarios where consent is actually given, fictional
consent cases lack knowing and voluntary manifestation. Litigants in
fictional consent scenarios are precluded from bringing unraised consent
claims-claims that required litigant consent to decide-even though
they never provided (or withheld) consent to the initial court's
jurisdiction over those claims. Subsequent courts that apply claim
preclusion over unraised consent claims assume that the party would
have consented. The court embraces fictional consent, thereby
eradicating the fundamental due process protection that consent

provides.
Bankruptcy is the paradigmatic example of fictional consent.
Bankruptcy courts frequently make final decisions on a variety of issues
by way of litigant consent, likely due to their vast jurisdictional reach61

58 See generally Hessick, supra note 46. Courts rely upon the doctrine of exhaustion to avoid

constitutional challenges to the agency adjudicator's ability to reach claims that otherwise would be
heard in the first instance by an Article III court. Whether this ultimate review on appeal-after
exhaustion in the Article I labyrinth and with only deferential review-provides meaningful Article
III oversight may, itself, be a legal fiction.
59

Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985) (focusing on the

voluntary nature of defendants who were subject to agency arbitration proceedings).
60

See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 418-19 (1966) (declaring as

final only those agency determinations made within the scope of the agency's authority). Applying
claim preclusion in administrative law contexts is far from straightforward, but for the most part
the specific problem of fictional consent addressed in this Article does not arise. For example,
consent to jurisdiction mitigates some of the concerns about the independence of agency

adjudication. See Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. 943, 982-89 (2017)
(discussing agency incentives to use adjudication to develop policies and noting potential
concerns).
61

See Section II.A.

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

2582

[Vol. 41:2561

and well-established tradition of consent-based authority.62 Bankruptcy
cases move quickly to restructure an ailing debtor that is losing value like
a "melting ice cube."63 Resolving the debtor's issues often requires a
bankruptcy court to evaluate broad categories of issues. In the trenches of
a bankruptcy case, litigants and judges commonly pursue creative
resolutions to endless challenges that a debtor may face. Bankruptcy is a
wonderfully nimble specialized environment, but it is also one that
mystifies many participants. These characteristics make it a vulnerable
forum for the problem of fictional consent. In Part II, I further outline the
limits to bankruptcy court jurisdiction that create a reliance on litigant
consent, as well as the ways reviewing courts use fictional consent to give
claim preclusive effect to unraised claims in bankruptcy.
Courts may also use fictional consent to preclude claims that are
forced into a forum by statute. This is true in the context of takings claims,
which litigants are required to ripen in state court proceedings before
raising them in federal court. 64 Generally, a litigant may elect to raise
constitutional claims in either state or federal court. 65 As commentators
note, the takings plaintiff may be precluded from bringing the
constitutional claim in federal court due to an initial proceeding in state
court. 66 This preclusion occurs even though the litigant did not consent
to state court resolution of her constitutional claim, but was instead

mandated there and did not expressly withhold consent. 67 Courts
reaching this conclusion acknowledge that the state court would only
have jurisdiction over the constitutional claim with consent, but conclude

62

Ralph Brubaker, The Constitutionality of Litigant Consent to Non-Article III Bankruptcy

Adjudications, BANKR. L. LETTER, Dec. 2012, at 1, 7.
63 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014).
64

Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-97 (1985).

65 This consent conundrum arises when a party has both statutory and constitutional claims,
because the "transactional" approach to claim preclusion may require that all claims must be
brought together. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 24(2) (AM.

LAW INST. 1982) ("What

factual grouping constitutes a 'transaction' ... [is] to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to
such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether
they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties'
expectations or business understanding or usage.").
66 See

J. David Breemer,

You Can Check Out but You Can Never Leave: The Story of San Remo

Hotel-the Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under a Rule Intended

to Ripen the Claimsfor FederalReview, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 247, 248 n.3 (2006).
67

In effect, the doctrine requires affirmative nonconsent to reserve a plaintiffs federal rights.
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that the litigant is "deemed to have consented" to resolution in state court
according to the statutory requirements.68 Because no actual consent was
given, courts rely on fictional consent to impose preclusive effect.
As this Part illustrates, consent plays an important role in claim
preclusion doctrine, in different ways and different environments. To
highlight the problem of fictional consent, the next Part takes a closer
look at bankruptcy and the specific challenges that claim preclusion
presents in that system.
II.

CLAIM PRECLUSION AND BANKRUPTCY COURTS

After years of uncertainty, recent Supreme Court decisions outlining
the proper scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction have-at least
temporarily-provided a degree of stability to the system's welldocumented Article III fault lines. Bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to
finally determine certain categories of claims but may only issue final
determinations for other categories of claims if the parties give their
express or implied consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. While
this resolution provides welcome clarity to those who litigate and hear
bankruptcy cases, the notion of "jurisdiction by consent" leaves
significant instability in its stead relating to future claims.
Because bankruptcy cases frequently involve issues and disputes of
state law, state courts are commonly asked to evaluate the claim
preclusive effect of claims which were, or could have been, raised in the
context of a prior restructuring case. But neither the states, nor the federal
circuit courts of appeals, have reached a consensus about whether and
when claim preclusion reaches consent claims that were never raised in
the bankruptcy court.

68

Id. at 258 ("If so, then some state court litigants who did not consent to state adjudication of

constitutional claims could nevertheless be deemed to have so consented and to have waived their
right to district court review out of an effort to comply with Windsor.").
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Bankruptcy CourtJurisdictionalLimits

A.

For decades, courts and commentators alike have analyzed the
various contours of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.69 Bankruptcy courts
are not Article III courts, but instead derive their power from Article I of
the Constitution in an adjunct role to the federal district courts. Because
bankruptcy courts are frequently asked to hear and decide issues

involving private rights between creditors and debtors-the types of
claims that the Constitution preserves for Article III courts-there is

constant tension and uncertainty surrounding bankruptcy court
jurisdiction. Congress created the modern bankruptcy system in 1978,
and since then has made various revisions to provide appropriate
statutory guidance on the issue of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
also drastically impacted the role, structure, and power of bankruptcy
courts through its decisions relating to bankruptcy court authority. While
many open questions remain, there is relative clarity on a number of key

concepts surrounding bankruptcy court jurisdiction and authority.
Bankruptcy courts are created pursuant to Congress's powers "[t]o
establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States."70 In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co., the Supreme Court highlighted bankruptcy judges' lack of
structural protections such as life tenure and salary, and concluded that
as a result bankruptcy judges may constitutionally exercise "the judicial
Power of the United States" only over those matters that lie "at the core
of the federal bankruptcy power."71

69

See, e.g., Charles

J.

Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.

BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 23 (1995); Ralph Brubaker, A "Summary" Statutory and Constitutional
Theory of Bankruptcy Judges' Core Jurisdiction After Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121
(2012); Michelle Wright, From Stem to Stern: Navigating Bankruptcy Practice After Stern v.

Marshall, 77 Mo. L. REV. 1159, 1170-73 (2012); Bethany A. Corbin, Losing at Dodge Ball:
Understanding the Supreme Court's Implied Authorization of Consent in Executive Benefits

Insurance Agency v. Arkison and Why Revision of 28 U.S.C.
DRAKE L. REV. 109, 118 (2015).
70

s 157(B) Is Criticalfor Clarity, 63

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50,61-63, 71, 87 (1982) (plurality
opinion) ("We conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1471, as added by § 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978,
71

has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from
the Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to create adjuncts to Art. III
courts." (citations omitted)).
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Congress responded to the Supreme Court's Northern Pipeline

decision by passing the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984 (BAFJA), which amends Title 28 of the United States Code to
include sections 157 and 1334.72 These sections provide a "patch" to the
constitutional deficiency by clarifying the jurisdictional structure in
§ 1334,73 and categorizing core and noncore claims in § 157.74 The 1984
revisions make clear that the bankruptcy court has authority to hear cases
by referral from the district court, and the district court maintains passive
oversight authority.75 Under § 157(b)(1), the bankruptcy court has
jurisdictional power to decide claims "arising under" or "arising in" the
Code.76 The bankruptcy court also exercises "related to" jurisdiction,
which extends to all matters in which "the outcome of that proceeding
could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in

bankruptcy." 77Related-to jurisdiction is remarkably broad, and reaches
many nonbankruptcy claims that turn on state law. 78

The revised § 157 also created a statutory divide between "core" and
"noncore" proceedings that may come before a bankruptcy court. The
bankruptcy court could finally decide core claims, but could only resolve

72 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 101,
104, 98 Stat. 333, 333, 340-41.
73

28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b) (2018) (granting district courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction

of all cases under title 11" and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction "ofall civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11").
74

Id. § 157(b)-(c).

75

Id. § 157(d). This oversight role includes taking appeals from bankruptcy court matters, as

well as the ability to withdraw the reference and regain active administration of a bankruptcy case
at will or upon a party's request.
76

"Arising under" claims are those that are created or determined by a statutory provision

under Title 11, while "arising in" claims include those that are not expressly created by the
Bankruptcy Code but which could not exist outside of the bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, 564

U.S. 462, 476-79 (2011).
7 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743
F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)).
78

Michael H. Goldstein, Res JudicataStrikes Twice, 2002 AM. BANKR. INST.

J.

16,41 ("The types

of third-party claims that could potentially fall within this scenario include (1) claims among
holders of different tranches of debt, (2) breach of fiduciary duty related claims and (3) torturous
interference claims, to the extent that such claims are inextricably linked to the facts and
circumstances leading to the bankruptcy case.").

There is historical precedent for broad

jurisdictional reach dating back to the judicial power of bankruptcy commissioners in England. See
James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the JudicialPower of the United States,
118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 719-20 (2004) (noting the role of English bankruptcy commissioners to
decide certain claims in addition to administering the estate).
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noncore claims by either the parties' consent, or by submitting proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo
review. 79 In 2011, that distinction became further complicated by Stern v.
Marshall.80In Stern, the Supreme Court held that certain claims Congress
identified as "core" under the Bankruptcy Code (a statutory basis) still
required Article III review (on a constitutional basis). In two later cases,
the Supreme Court clarified that the constitutional infirmity it found in
Stern claims could be remedied similarly to the Code's treatment of
noncore claims: by either giving the claims de novo review in the district
court, 81 or through litigants' express or implied consent. 82
B.

Claim PreclusionArising out of Bankruptcy Cases

Claim preclusion extends to bankruptcy court decisions,83 and the
special nature of the bankruptcy process creates interesting and
challenging questions about how and when claim preclusion applies.84

79

28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2018); see also Harvey v. Dambowsky (In re Dambowsky), 526 B.R.

590, 595 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2015) ("Although they are related concepts ...

the scope of the

bankruptcy courts' subject matter jurisdiction, their statutory authority to hear and/or determine
any particular matter, and their constitutional authority to do so, each are delineated by different
statutory, constitutional, and/or judicial authorities.").
s8 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
si

Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 34-36 (2014).

82

Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1947-48 (2015). In Wellness, the

Supreme Court also recognized the possibility that implied consent is sufficient to permit a
bankruptcy court to exercise its judicial power over a litigant's claims. Implied consent in this
context is different from fictional consent because it refers to a party's knowing and voluntary
actions, rather than words. Id.; see also Richard K. Milin & Yitzhak Greenberg, Wellness on
Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction:PracticallySpeaking, Silence Can Mean Consent, NORTON BANKR.
L. ADVISER, May 2015, at 1, 7. For a discussion of ways in which the Supreme Court takes a formalist
approach to deciding the constitutionality of non-Article III adjudications but a functionalist
review of the party's consent to such adjudications, see Ralph Brubaker, Non-Article III
Adjudication: Bankruptcy and Nonbankruptcy, With and Without Consent, 33 EMORY BANKR.

DEVS. J. 11, 15-16 (2016).
83

Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 134-39 (1979).

84

For example, scholars struggle to interpret and predict whether and how key milestones of

the bankruptcy process will have claim preclusive effect. See Christopher Klein, Lawrence Ponoroff
& Sarah Borrey, Principlesof Preclusionand Estoppel in Bankruptcy Cases, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 839,
888 (2005) ("One of the most perplexing problems in bankruptcy is determining the preclusive
effect of plan confirmation."); Kevin M. Lewis, Paul M. Lopez, Scott Lawrence & Tim S. Springer,
Recent Developments in Estoppel andPreclusionDoctrines in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases; Volume
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Congress designed the bankruptcy process to expansively address any
issues related to the debtor's estate. Each bankruptcy case involves a

complicated web of relationships between the debtor and its creditors,
between different categories of creditors (secured, unsecured, etc.), and
between individual creditors. Bankruptcy procedure permits claims
arising out of these different relationships to be tested under the umbrella
of a single debtor's case, even if the disputes only tangentially involve the

debtor.
Most issues directly involving the debtor's restructuring will be
resolved in the main bankruptcy case. Parties may challenge all elements
of the debtor's bankruptcy, including common issues like the terms of the
proposed debtor-in-possession financing, the process by which the

debtor seeks to sell the business, and the distribution of assets in a
bankruptcy plan of reorganization. Other claims must be brought in an
adversary proceeding, a "case within a case" that closely mirrors standard
civil litigation.85 Adversary proceedings require the bankruptcy court to

decide any number of claims between seemingly endless combinations of
parties.86 Recall that claim preclusion bars parties or their privies from

bringing in a second proceeding any claim that was (or could have been)
raised in the first proceeding. In bankruptcy, claim preclusion could
apply to hundreds or even thousands of "parties" and reach just as many
diverse claims that were raised before the bankruptcy court.
The complexity grows exponentially when a party seeks to raise
claim preclusion as a defense to claims that were not raised in a prior
bankruptcy case. For unraised claims, the preclusion analysis turns on
whether they "could have been raised" in the bankruptcy, which in turn
relates back to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. One challenging
aspect of bankruptcy claim preclusion doctrine springs from the

II of I: Preclusion, 67 OKLA. L. REv. 733 (2015) (describing the contours of claim preclusion in
bankruptcy cases).
85 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 (outlining instances where an adversary proceeding is required).
86 In Taylor v. Sturgell, the Supreme Court identified bankruptcy as one of the "special statutory

scheme[s]" that warrant nonparty preclusion, as long as the schemes are "otherwise consistent with
due process." 553 U.S. 880, 895 (2008). At first glance this reference seems to end the inquiry about
claim preclusion of nonparties in bankruptcy. Such an assumption is true in the simplest example,
involving silent creditors who are precluded from bringing claims against the debtor after the
bankruptcy court confirms a plan of reorganization. However, the list of claim preclusion scenarios
in bankruptcy reaches far beyond the simplest example, and defining whether a particular entity is
a "party" or "nonparty" with regard to a specific claim is not always an easy task.
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core/noncore distinction outlined in the previous Section.87 Due to the
constitutional limitations that prevent a bankruptcy court from finally
deciding certain claims without a litigant's consent, it remains uncertain
whether the bankruptcy court is a court of "competent jurisdiction" that
can "finally decide" those claims for claim preclusion purposes without
consent.
There is no dispute that a bankruptcy court's decision in "core"
matters, such as confirming a plan of reorganization, is final and has
claim preclusive effect. Imagine a retail company files for bankruptcy and
confirms a plan of reorganization that discharges all of the company's

debt. If one of the company's vendors did not object to the bankruptcy
plan but instead tries to pursue a later claim for breach of contract against
the debtor in state court, then claim preclusion will bar the state suit. The
same parties are involved in both proceedings; the bankruptcy court is a
court of competent jurisdiction; the same debt is at issue; and the
bankruptcy plan confirmation finally decided the issue. Each element of
the claim preclusion test is satisfied, and the interests of fairness and
finality are in harmony.
The outcome is less certain in the context of "noncore" claims. If the
same vendor has a breach of contract claim against another vendor (not

the debtor) that the vendor did not raise in the bankruptcy case, but later
brought in state court. For instance, the defendant vendor could have

been obligated to provide some service to the debtor under a contract
between the defendant vendor and the plaintiff vendor. The plaintiff
vendor might allege that she was harmed when the defendant vendor did
not perform services to the debtor, resulting in the debtor's inability to
pay the plaintiff vendor. Because the unraised claim was noncore, the
bankruptcy court would not have been able to resolve it without both

vendors' consent. 88
Had the plaintiff vendor raised the claim before the bankruptcy
court, she would have given actual consent, either impliedly by asking the

87 One ongoing area of inconsistency and uncertainty in bankruptcy court authority relates to

which claims qualify as core and noncore. Since Stern, courts have grappled with different types of
claims, different parties, and different contexts to decide in which bucket a particular claim should
fall. This Article recognizes, but then sets aside, that issue and focuses on unraised claims that are
undisputedly noncore. As the dust settles on the core/noncore divide over time, the potential
impact of fictional consent could grow even broader as the number of noncore claims increases.
88 This claim would arise in the context of an adversary proceeding, where most noncore claims

are resolved.
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bankruptcy court to decide the dispute, or expressly by making a
statement of jurisdictional consent in accordance with Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 7008.89 The vendors' consent would make the
bankruptcy court a court of "competent jurisdiction" that could "finally
decide" the breach-of-contract claim for preclusion purposes. But
because the plaintiff vendor did not raise the claim until after the

bankruptcy concluded, the state court in proceeding two is obligated to
hypothetically question whether the vendor would have consented.90
Courts that are asked to evaluate the claim preclusive effect of unraised
consent claims in bankruptcy do not agree on the proper treatment, and
follow one of two approaches.
1.

The Majority Approach to Preclusion of Unraised Consent Claims

A majority of courts reviewing the question conclude that claim
preclusion should bar unraised noncore claims, notwithstanding the fact
that the bankruptcy court would have needed litigant consent for
authority to finally decide such claims.91 These courts conclude that there

89 Recall that bankruptcy courts have authority to decide some, but not all, of a party's claims
without consent, based upon whether they are designated as core or noncore. In this hypothetical,
the defendant vendor would have the opportunity to withhold consent in a responsive pleading.
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012 (requiring a statement regarding consent or non-consent to
jurisdiction).
90 At first glance it may seem like this question is simply resolved. The Restatement explains

that unasserted supplemental claims should be precluded in a second proceeding if there was
concurrent jurisdiction in the first proceeding, unless the first court would "clearly have declined
to exercise [its jurisdiction] as a matter of discretion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1982). To be sure, this example alludes to the concept of fictional consent by
considering what the initial court would have done had a claim been raised (even though it never
happened). However, the Restatement's discussion of supplemental claims focuses on jurisdiction
that relies on court discretion, not litigant consent, and does not resolve the problem of fictional
consent in bankruptcy.
91

Davenport v. Djourabchi, 296 F. Supp. 3d 245, 255-56 (D.D.C. 2017) (weighing the two lines

of interpretation, and concluding that claim preclusion should apply to both core and noncore

unraised claims), on reconsideration,316 F. Supp. 3d 58 (D.D.C. 2018); Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 224
F.3d 1161, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding the claim preclusion standard satisfied, even if the
bankruptcy court was not able to issue a final decision without the party's consent); CoreStates

Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Robertson v. Isomedix, Inc.
(In re Int'l Nutronics, Inc.), 28 F.3d 965, 969-70 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Sanders Confectionery
Prods. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 483 (6th Cir. 1992) (same); Sure-Snap Corp. v. State St.
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are heightened risks to finality in the bankruptcy context, and that the
litigant would likely have consented to the claim being decided had it
been raised. Without consent, the bankruptcy court may still hear a
dispute, and then issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. Still more,
the district court (which referred the bankruptcy matter to the
bankruptcy court in the first instance) is standing at the ready to grant a

jurisdictionally sound final order that provides the vendor's remedy.
Through this perspective, the bankruptcy court's lack of authority to
finally decide issues without consent does not prevent it from being a
"court of competent jurisdiction" for claim preclusion purposes. 92
The majority approach is misguided for a number of reasons. First,
the Supreme Court's recent narrowing of bankruptcy courts'
constitutional authority offers a strong indication that the limits and
distinctions trigger significant separation of powers structural norms.
Second, claim preclusion's evaluation of the "competent jurisdiction" and
"final decision" elements traditionally turn on the forum's ability to offer
a remedy, not merely hear the dispute. The bankruptcy court, alone,
cannot offer a remedy unless the party consents. Presuming that the party
would have made the decision to simply accept the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction ignores the real implications of that decision. Beyond
withholding consent and insisting on district court de novo review,93 the
party could have asked the district court to withdraw the reference
altogether (securing direct Article III adjudication to build the record in
the first instance) or, in certain cases, seek the bankruptcy court's
permissive or mandatory abstention in favor of state courts. 94
Next, applying claim preclusion to noncore claims in bankruptcy
may already press upon a party's due process right to a day in court due
to the attenuated nature of the claims. Many noncore claims in the
bankruptcy context are so distant from the litigant's likely understanding
of the proceeding's scope that it is questionable whether their actual

Bank & Tr. Co., 948 F.2d 869, 870-74 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). Although many of these cases pre-date
Stern, their logic would apply equally to noncore claims and Stern claims.
92 See, e.g., Ralph E. Avery, Chapter11 Bankruptcy and Principlesof Res Judicata, 102 COM. L.J.
257, 259, 286-89 (1997) (rejecting the validity of any distinction between the bankruptcy court's
authority and the combination of district court and bankruptcy court review).
93

This is the default outcome when consent is removed, and the one that most courts and

commentators consider when dismissing the problem of fictional consent. See Avery, supra note

92, at 286-89.
94 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (2018) (providing for mandatory and permissive abstention).
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consent to being before a bankruptcy court via filing a proof of claim
against the debtor should constitute consent for purposes of claim
preclusion. For example, litigants who file a proof of claim may not
anticipate or understand that it constitutes consent over their lawsuits

against the debtor or impacting the debtor's assets under a plan of
reorganization. Applying claim preclusion on the basis of fictional
consent layers another problematic dimension, all in the interest of
finality. Finally, practically speaking, if parties are precluded from
attenuated consent claims, the likely result is that the bankruptcy court

would be flooded with prophylactic adversary proceedings on "related to"
claims. This would draw the court's attention to dark corners of state law
and delay the core focus of bankruptcy: the quick and efficient
administration of the debtor's estate. 95 "Preclusion doctrine . . . is

intended to reduce the burden of litigation on courts and parties,"96 not
increase it.
2.

The Minority Approach to Preclusion of Unraised Consent Claims

A minority of circuits do not extend claim preclusion to unraised
consent claims through fictional consent. Courts taking this approach
offer a simple-and formalistic-analysis: because the bankruptcy court
could not finally decide the noncore claim without consent, and because
no consent was given, claim preclusion does not apply.97 The minorityapproach courts recognize that the claim at issue could have been raised

under the court's "related to" jurisdiction and approved by a district court

95 Goldstein, supra note 78, at 40-41 (observing the "staggering" impact of expanding claim
preclusion to claims by a creditor against a non-debtor under the bankruptcy court's "related to"
jurisdiction).
96

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008).

97

E. Minerals & Chems. Co. v. Mahan, 225 F.3d 330, 337-38 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Claim preclusion

only bars claims arising from the same cause of action previously raised, not every conceivable claim
that could have been brought in the context of a bankruptcy case over which the court would have

had jurisdiction."); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Atlanta Retail, Inc., 456 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th
Cir. 2006) (applying section 27 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments); George A. Martinez,
The Res Judicata Effect of Bankruptcy Court Judgments: The Procedural and Constitutional
Concerns, 62 Mo. L. REV. 9 (1997) (collecting cases and summarizing the two approaches to claim
preclusion of unraised, noncore claims).
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on de novo review, but conclude that the lack of actual consent ends the
analysis.98
The minority approach misses the mark by insulating too many
claims from preclusion. If all unraised consent claims escape preclusion,
then certain claims that likely should have been raised during the
bankruptcy process can drag the relevant parties back to court in a second

proceeding. Consider noncore claims raised by a debtor against a
creditor. The debtor files the bankruptcy case and is responsible for
identifying and sharing all of its possible claims as part of its mandatory
disclosures. 99 There is little doubt that the debtor knows the bankruptcy
is the appropriate place to resolve all of its claims, and the debtor will have
a full and fair opportunity to be heard before the bankruptcy court. Under
these facts, the fundamental due process concerns that may arise in other
contexts involving unraised, noncore claims do not apply. 100 Both finality
and fairness weigh in favor of precluding the debtor's suit,
notwithstanding the absence of actual consent. 101

C.

The Problem of Fictional Consent in Bankruptcy

As identified above, fictional consent is most pronounced in
bankruptcy courts. Because bankruptcy courts have such broad relatedto jurisdiction,102 the number of claims that could be heard by the
bankruptcy court-and which become subject to claim preclusion if not
raised-is quite large.103 Additionally, the collective structure of

98

Colvin v. Amegy Mortg. Co., LLC, 507 B.R. 169, 190 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (declining to give

claim preclusive effect to a party's failure to bring an avoidance action counterclaim in lift stay
motion, notwithstanding the fact that the party could have raised the claim).
99

See 11 U.S.C. § 521(b)(1) (2018) (obligating the debtor to disclose its assets, which include

claims).
loo See Section

IC.

igi Even the debtor must consent to final bankruptcy court resolution of noncore claims. The

debtor's consent to the bankruptcy court's resolution of some claims may not operate as consent to
resolving all claims.

102 See Section II.A.
103

This fiction is compounded by the miniscule actions that are necessary to "consent" to the

bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction. See DePaola v. Sleepy's LLC (In re Prof 1 Facilities Mgmt.), No. 14-

31095-WRS, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3643, at *6 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2015) (finding consent where
an adversary proceeding defendant filed a counterclaim against the estate slightly in excess of the
debtor's claim and expressly declined to consent). But see Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135
S. Ct. 1932, 1948 (2015) (requiring implied consent to be such that "counsel was made aware of the
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bankruptcy involves seemingly endless parties in interest. Courts have
observed that the oddities of the forum make claim preclusion an
"awkward fit" in bankruptcy. 104 Each of these parties may be involved in
a bankruptcy case by means of their claim against a debtor, but may also
have claims against other creditors or the bankruptcy estate professionals.
Another court could use claim preclusion to prevent any claims that
could have some conceivable effecto5 on the debtor's plan of
confirmation in the initial bankruptcy case.
1.

Fictional Consent in Action

To better understand the problems posed by fictional consent claim
preclusion in bankruptcy, consider the following hypothetical example.
Imagine a microchip company, Mister Chips Inc. ("Mr. Chips" or the
"debtor"), files for chapter 11 protection in bankruptcy court. As part of
the bankruptcy claims allowance process, many creditors file a proof of
claim. Two of these creditors, in particular, merit our focus. First is Sal's
Sand Emporium ("SSE"). SSE provided bulk specialized sand to the
debtor for use in its fabrication process and filed a claim in the

bankruptcy for $50,000 in unpaid invoices. The second creditor is
Mobilecon Cellular ("Mobilecon"), a small, domestic cell phone
manufacturer that incorporates Mr. Chips microchips into its products.

Around five months prior to the bankruptcy, the debtor ordered and
received 200 specialized phones from Mobilecon for corporate use, but
never paid, leaving Mobilecon with a $175,000 bankruptcy claim. As the
bankruptcy progressed, the court approved a sale of substantially all of

the debtor's assets to a separate entity, and then confirmed a liquidating
plan to wind down the remaining affairs and distribute the small collected
value to creditors. After the plan is confirmed, the court bids goodbye to
Mr. Chips106 and the case concludes.

need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the
non-Article III adjudicator").

104 See Brown Media Corp. v. K&L Gates, LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2017) (collecting
cases identifying the same peculiarities).
105

This connection may be as attenuated as a potential guarantee that upon certain narrow

circumstances could be triggered in a way that could harm the debtor's estate.

106 See generally JAMES HILTON, GOODBYE, MR. CHIPS (Hoddler & Stoughton, 1934).
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Sometime prior to the petition date of Mr. Chips's bankruptcy, SSE
also had ordered phones from Mobilecon.107 SSE was not happy with the
phones it received, one of which caught on fire and burnt an employee.
After the bankruptcy concluded, Mobilecon began attempting to collect
the outstanding payment amounts that SSE refused to pay. Sensing
trouble, SSE went on the offensive by filing a state court lawsuit against
Mobilecon in Washington (where both companies are headquartered),
alleging a defect under the state products liability statute. 108 Mobilecon
raised claim preclusion as a defense, claiming that SSE could have
brought the products liability claim before the bankruptcy court, and
therefore was not permitted to have a second bite at the apple in state

court. In the course of discovery, Mobilecon produced a version of its
contract with Mr. Chips. The contract contained an indemnification
provision
under
which Mobilecon
could
conceivably
seek
indemnification from Mr. Chips for any amounts due to SSE (per the
terms of the contract, this indemnification obligation would turn on
whether the problem with the phone was caused by a faulty microchip).
The outcome in this hypothetical would depend on where Mr. Chips
filed for bankruptcy. The Washington state court would evaluate claim
preclusion under the federal standard applied in the circuit where the first
proceeding was held. If the bankruptcy was filed in the minorityapproach circuits, there would be no claim preclusive effect because the
bankruptcy court was not a court of "competent jurisdiction" vis-a-vis
the noncore products liability claim. The litigants did not actually consent
to the court's jurisdiction; therefore, the bankruptcy court had no
authority to offer the parties any remedy.
In contrast, the majority-approach circuits would find that the
bankruptcy plan's confirmation had claim preclusive effect on SSE's state
law claim. Both parties to the state court suit were parties to the
bankruptcy because they each filed a proof of claim. The bankruptcy

court would be deemed a court of "competent jurisdiction," because the
products liability claim would fall under the bankruptcy court's "related
to" jurisdiction through the remote possibility that the debtor's
indemnification obligation would impact the estate's assets. It does not
matter that the unraised claim is noncore and that the bankruptcy court

107

Generally, bankruptcy resolves pre-petition claims against the debtor.

108

See Washington Products Liability Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.72.010-.070 (1981). Assume

for purposes of this example that the claims were all within the respective statutes of limitation.
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would have required the parties' consent to finally decide it. 109 Last, the
presence of the debtor's possible indemnification obligation, however
slight, is sufficient to say that the products liability suit is the "same claim"
as the bankruptcy confirmation order (which finally resolved the debtor's
assets and liabilities).110
Surely this is not how claim preclusion was designed to operate. To
say that SSE should have known to bring this unrelated claim against a
non-debtor in the bankruptcy process, and to presume that SSE would
have consented to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the purely
state law claim, is preposterous. Constitutional due process limitations on
claim preclusion focus on the day-in-court ideal, asking whether the

parties had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. Neither element
is present under these circumstances. Even sophisticated businesses could
misunderstand the degree to which the bankruptcy court's broad
jurisdiction operates as a claim preclusion vacuum. SSE may have
followed the bankruptcy closely and yet still not understood that its claim

against another creditor would be barred. Of course, had SSE brought the
products liability challenge in the bankruptcy case, nobody would
challenge any decision's preclusive effect. But when faced with the option
of presuming that SSE would have consented, versus the opposite
presumption-that it would have declined consent111-the support of
finality must yield to due process protections.
2.

Testing the Due Process Limit

Due process "fairness" requirements for whether a party is bound by
a court's decision should be analyzed separately from whether a party is

109 In this way, applying claim preclusion to unraised, noncore claims in bankruptcy embraces

the fiction of consent.

no

These parties would not be completely without remedy. SSE could technically move to

reopen the bankruptcy, a remedy that requires extraordinary circumstances that are not obvious
on these facts.
iml Avery, supra note 92, at 288 ("Since the bankruptcy court can enter a final judgment in a

noncore matter with the consent of the parties, it is entirely conceivable that, had a non-core matter
actually been litigated, the parties might have consented to the entry of a final order by the
bankruptcy court. When addressing this point in the context of an attempt to litigate a non-core
matter in a second proceeding, however, the plaintiff in effect seeks a conclusive presumption that
it would not have consented to the entry of a final order by the bankruptcy court in the first
proceeding.").
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precluded from bringing unraised claims as a result of that decision. For
example, in bankruptcy, there are minimum notice requirements for
approving a sale free and clear of other interests.112 If the parties who
might make claims against the sold property received sufficient notice
and an opportunity to be heard, then they are precluded from later
challenging the sale. But under claim preclusion doctrine in bankruptcy
cases, the sale order could preclude creditors from making claims against
other creditors (not against the purchaser or the debtor). The notice that
is necessary to adequately apprise creditors of the latter impact surely
ought to be evaluated separately from the former.113
The key analysis for purposes of claim preclusion should turn on (1)
the degree to which the party challenging preclusion was a "party" in the
initial proceeding with respect to the specific claim facing preclusion, and
(2) as a result, what level of notice is appropriate.114 In the most-often
discussed bankruptcy final order, confirmation of a bankruptcy plan, the
parties should include the debtor and all creditors who may want to make
a claim with respect to the debtor's asset. Plan confirmation is the final
step in the bankruptcy case that decides how the debtor's estate will be

distributed, extinguishes any rights not provided for or reserved in the
plan, and sets in motion a chain of events that replaces the debtor with a
new legal entity. While unknown or silent creditors are non-parties
because they have not filed a proof of claim against the bankruptcy

12

See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2018); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2), 6004(a). The Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure provide standard notice guidelines, however, courts have made clear that
due process may require additional protections. See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135 (2d

Cir. 2016); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010).
113

Various commentators have evaluated the intersection of due process and bankruptcy, some

even noting the potential implications of claim preclusion in that analysis. See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker,
Supreme Court Upholds "Dischargeby Declaration"of Student Loan Debts in Chapter13 (or Does
It?), BANKR. L. LETTER, June 2010, at 1. This topic, especially in the context of claim preclusion,
merits additional scholarly attention.
114

In Taylor v. Sturgell, the Supreme Court identified bankruptcy as one of the "special statutory

schemes" that warrant nonparty preclusion, as long as the schemes are "otherwise consistent with
due process." 553 U.S. 880, 895 (2008). At first glance, this reference seems to end the inquiry about
claim preclusion of non-parties in bankruptcy. Such an assumption is true in the simplest example,
involving silent creditors who are precluded from bringing claims against the debtor after the
bankruptcy court confirms a plan of reorganization. However, the list of claim preclusion scenarios
in bankruptcy reaches far beyond the simplest example, and defining whether a particular entity is
a "party" or "nonparty" with regard to a specific claim is not always an easy task.
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estate, 115 the bankruptcy plan nonetheless extinguishes their prebankruptcy rights against the debtor under an approved nonparty due
process requirement for in rem proceedings.116
Consider a simple plan through which a debtor is distributing its
remaining assets among creditors. In that case, the only "party"
relationships at issue are between the individual creditors filing a proof

of claim and the debtor, and due process is satisfied by the simple notice
followed by a hearing on plan confirmation required by the bankruptcy
rules. Nonparty creditors or claimants against the debtor may also be
bound without notice due to the unique nature of finality in bankruptcy.
While a creditor is a "party" to the plan confirmation for purposes of
resolving its claim against the debtor,117 it should not automatically be
considered a "party" in the context of a separate claim against another
creditor that is "related to" the bankruptcy case. 118 Technically this
creditor is a "party" because it filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy
case against the debtor; however, it is unlikely that the creditor will be
evaluating the proceeding in the capacity of its separate claim. Claims
between creditors in a bankruptcy are conceptually similar to crossclaims

115

With a few exceptions, such as future claimants, only creditors who file a proof of claim are

eligible to receive distribution from the creditor. By filing a proof of claim, the creditor becomes a
"party" to the bankruptcy case. This definition of a "party" does not, however, diminish the binding
nature of a bankruptcy discharge on absent claimants who received notice of the bankruptcy but
never brought a claim.
116

Minzner, supra note 32, at 604 n.37 ("The Supreme Court has not clearly explained why

nonparty preclusion is constitutional in [bankruptcy] cases, but the answer probably lies in the need
for finality. In this way, these proceedings can be seen as another example of Mathews-style
balancing where the value of finality is allowed to overcome the general rule against nonparty
preclusion."). This exclusion, and cases cited to support it, focuses on the collective nature of
bankruptcy to distribute the debtor's assets through claims allowance process.
117

With basic notice and a hearing, the creditor is on notice of all disputes against the debtor

and due process would be satisfied as to precluding all unraised claims against the debtor. The same
is true of the debtor's claims against creditors, because the debtor has notice of everything that
occurs in the bankruptcy case and has strong leverage to drive the direction of the proceedings.
118 Compare this example with the plan confirmation in United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa,
599 U.S. 260 (2010). There, a student loan creditor argued that due process was insufficient when
default interest payments were discharged in a Chapter 13 plan, rather than a separate adversary
proceeding (as required by the Bankruptcy Code). Id. at 272. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that the notice in the plan was sufficient to prevent overturning the confirmation as void. Id. Unlike
the hypothetical creditor in this Article, who had a claim against the debtor that was completely
separate from one against another creditor, the loan creditor in Espinosa was pursuing the very
same interest under the plan and in the missing adversary proceeding: collection of penalties on the
student loan.
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between defendants in civil litigation.119 But unlike claims between
creditors, a defendant's failure to bring a crossclaim against his codefendant in civil litigation will not preclude the claim in a later
proceeding. 120 For this reason, the bankruptcy creditor should be entitled

to more robust notice before her separate, unraised claim can be
precluded in future proceedings. 121
As to how much notice is sufficient for claim preclusive effect, it will
depend on the circumstances.122 Courts evaluating notice look for three
elements: (1) content that reasonably conveys to the recipient all the
required information; (2) transmission of the information in a manner
that is reasonably calculated to reach all interested parties; and (3) a
reasonable time for response. 123 Because the bankruptcy system already
imposes a robust notice regime, the content and timing elements are most
relevant to the application of claim preclusion to fictional consent
claims. 124 As to content, perhaps the due process concerns highlighted

above could be addressed by adding a simple disclaimer to every

119 FED R. CIv. P. 13(g); see also Mary Kay Kane, Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal
Civil Procedure, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1723, 1729 (1998) (describing the contours of crossclaims).
120

See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 6 FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1431 (3d ed. 2020) ("A party who decides not to bring a claim under
Rule 13(g) will not be barred by res judicata, waiver, or estoppel from asserting it in a later

action .... ); see also Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Arby Constr., Inc., 798 N.W.2d 715, 719-22 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting a claim preclusion defense that a defendant used to challenge an unraised
crossclaim from a prior proceeding).
12

The specific components of a bankruptcy plan may impact this analysis. For example, certain

circuits permit bankruptcy plans to include third-party releases as part of the debtor's bargain. See,

e.g., In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Washington Mut., Inc., 442
B.R. 314,352 (D. Del. 2011);Nat'l Heritage Found.,Inc.v. Highbourne Found., 760 F.3d 344,351 (4th Cir. 2014);
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648,657-58 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Airadigm Commc'ns., Inc., 519 F.3d 640,
656 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Seaside Eng'g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d 1070, 1078 (11th Cir. 2015). In such
instances, the parties to the dispute would also include creditors/third parties who have claims
against the released parties, as the nature of the "case" relates to their claims. The potential
implications of third-party releases are subject to independent concerns relating to the court's
constitutional authority, all of which is beyond the scope of this Article.
122

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976) (creating a balancing test to evaluate how

much process is due in a given system); see also Gregory Germain, Due Process in Bankruptcy: Are
the New Automatic Dismissal Rules Constitutional?, 13 U. PA.

J.

BUS. L. 547, 586-87 (2011)

(explaining the application of Mathews to bankruptcy proceedings).
123

Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rogers (In re Eagle Bus Mfg., Inc.), 62 F.3d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1995).

124

Although bankruptcy notice obligations may be costly and burdensome, they do a relatively

good job of providing notice to parties. In this context, the bigger issues involve whether the parties
have time to do anything with the notice or understand what they should be on notice of.
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bankruptcy filing, stating "please be aware that any claim you may have
against any other party that has a potential impact on the debtor's estate

will be barred if you do not bring it in response to this proceeding." It is
unclear whether this notice would satisfy minimal due process standards,
especially given logistical constraints in the bankruptcy process. Under
the current system, it is extremely unlikely that creditors will know which

claims "have a potential impact" on the debtor. A debtor could be
required to list out its obligations in more detail to provide additional
notice, yet this option is practically impossible in some cases given the

already costly and burdensome

disclosure

requirements

in the

bankruptcy process. The same is true with regard to timing. In many parts
of the bankruptcy process, there is not sufficient time between notice and
a hearing for the creditor to evaluate and appreciate the claims that will
be decided, especially in instances where the debtor files with a
prepackaged plan of reorganization that allows bankruptcy to conclude
quickly. 125 Perhaps the better option is to recognize that it is simply not
possible to give claim preclusive effect to certain unraised claims.
3.

Practical Challenges

The procedural complexity and urgency in bankruptcy cases
exacerbates the due process problem. Claim preclusive effect may be
given to other bankruptcy milestones, such as a sale order under § 363.
Unlike in traditional civil litigation, where parties are more likely to have
an interest in (and therefore focus on) the full dispute, bankruptcy cases
can involve multiple components all proceeding simultaneously at a
rapid pace. It is commonplace for a large business chapter 11 case to
amass thousands of docket entries in just months. 126 Creditors, especially
those who are following the case without hiring bankruptcy attorneys,
may know to follow some parts of the case that would directly impact
their interest. Other parts of the case, including those that may be "core"

125

See Foteini Teloni, Chapter11 Duration,PreplannedCases, andRefiling Rates: An Empirical

Analysis in the Post-BAPCPA Era, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 571 (2015) (noting a significant
drop in bankruptcy case-time as prepackaged bankruptcies became more common).
126

For example, in the recent Toys "R" Us bankruptcy, the docket swelled to 4000 entries within

just thirty-three days after the company filed its bankruptcy petition. See Toys "R" Us, Inc., Docket,
PRIME CLERK, https://cases.primeclerk.com/toysrus/Home-Docketlnfo

XC9A].
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and trigger claim preclusion, could be completely off the creditor's radar.
Notice provisions in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure offer
mere weeks advance notice of substantive hearings, with objections due
in advance. The pleadings may span hundreds of pages, followed by still
more pages of underlying contracts and deal documents. For the average
creditor, the bankruptcy process is like a runaway train barreling through
the station. Most parties could identify the caboose,127 but few could
recognize individuals within the passenger railcars as the train speeds by.
Returning to our hypothetical example, assume that the Mobilecon
contract is now going to be sold in a § 363 sale, which requires just
twenty-one days' notice. Creditor SSE would have been notified of the
sale and hearing, but would have no meaningful time or opportunity to

understand that the Mobilecon contract being sold (listed deep in a
hundred-page sale agreement along with dozens of other contracts)
contained an indemnification provision relating to the cell phones that
SSE purchased from Mobilecon.
Finality is no doubt important in bankruptcy cases; the debtor will
cease to exist in its pre-bankruptcy form, and creditors will resolve their
outstanding claims against the debtor all within the bankruptcy case. For
this reason, all unraised claims that have a material impact on the
bankruptcy case will be precluded without reliance upon fictional
consent. 128 But fictional consent claims pose only a limited risk to the
heightened bankruptcy finality considerations because, at most, they
involve noncore claims between third parties.129 Litigants who are
precluded by fictional consent in bankruptcy are unlikely to know that
they face claim preclusion. In this way, claim preclusion is a harsh
consequence for unraised claims, but imposing it by fictional consent
compounds the injustice.

127

The caboose here represents plan confirmation, an obvious and important bankruptcy

milestone.
128 This includes all "core" claims. See supra Section II.A.
129

Claims by a creditor against a debtor are released in the plan confirmation process, the most

typical "final" order in the bankruptcy court that triggers claim preclusion. Other relevant
milestones in the bankruptcy process that have triggered claim preclusion include approval of a sale
order, approving a fee application, and approving settlements under section 9019 of the Bankruptcy

Code. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(b).
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RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF FICTIONAL CONSENT

The previous Part presented the problem of fictional consent
through the lens of bankruptcy proceedings. With that example in mind,
this Part begins the work of unraveling and ultimately resolving the
problem of fictional consent in claim preclusion.
A.

NarrowingFictional Consent in Diferent Environments

The Sections above highlight the fundamental problem of applying
claim preclusion by fictional consent. Beyond that basic conclusion, the
particular scope and characteristics of the problem will vary by system. 1 30
Although the Supreme Court suggests that "'crisp rules with sharp

corners' are preferable to a round-about doctrine of opaque standards," 131
desire for simplicity in claim preclusion analysis cannot overshadow
fundamental threats to personal rights and structural protections.132 The
presence of such threats in a given system requires deeper analysis. In
some contexts, and under certain circumstances, applying claim
preclusion to unraised claims in fictional consent scenarios may be
appropriate to preserve the interest of finality. In other instances, at the
opposite end of the spectrum, there should be no claim preclusion against
unraised claims to protect fairness norms and the requirements of due
process. Additional instances may fall at various points between these
poles. This Part undertakes the challenge of proposing a meaningful

130

Other commentators have suggested that preclusion standards should adapt when faced with

the unique challenges of applications in different environments. See, e.g., Riley T. Keenan, Identity
Crisis: Claim Preclusion in Constitutional Challenges to Statutes, 20 U. PA.

J.

CONST. L. 371, 406

(2017) (arguing for a series of structural-based exceptions to strict application of claim preclusion
in constitutional challenges to statutes); Karen L. Jones, Comment, Still FairAfter All These Years?

How Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion Should Be Modified in Cases of Copyright's Fair Use
Doctrine, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1071, 1110 (2011) (advocating for special preclusion rules to reflect
nuances in copyright law); Nathan D. Sturycz, The King andI?: An Examination of the Interest Qui
Tam Relators Represent and the Implicationsfor Future False Claims Act Litigation, 28 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 459, 492 (2009) (exploring claim preclusion challenges and proposing interpretation
for qui tam actions).
131

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008).

132

This aspirational quote also ignores the expansive body of claim preclusion law that is neither

"crisp" nor "sharp." The administrability concerns related to applying claim preclusion came into
being long before this Article and will continue long into the future.
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solution that is narrowly tailored to each specific system by first calling
for an analytical shift in the elements of claim preclusion, and then
second, incorporating that shift into a new taxonomy for applying claim
preclusion by fictional consent.
1.

Repurposing the "Could Have/Should Have" Divide

One of the more puzzling inconsistencies in claim preclusion
jurisprudence is the way courts describe claim preclusion's reach to
unraised claims. Most standards preclude claims that "could" have been
raised in the initial proceeding, while others instead give claim preclusive
effect to claims that "should" have been previously raised. Still another
approach, perhaps attempting to resolve the inconsistency, concludes
without analysis that a litigant "should" have raised any claim that he
"could" have raised. 133 This is nonsense. Any child with a hammer and a

piggy bank can understand the difference between "could" and "should."
There is no clear origin for this divide and evidence suggests that using
one standard versus another impacts the claim preclusive outcome.

Underlying claim preclusion doctrine recognizes a distinction between
the two categories of claims,134 yet many opinions are imprecise and
inconsistent on which category should be used in which context. Whether
a result of inadvertence, local development, or something altogether
different, the could-have-should-have inconsistency provides a useful
tool that can be repurposed to approach the problem of fictional consent.
In the claim preclusion context, whether a party "could" raise a claim
relates to pure possibility. Courts should ask if the cause of action was
available, and whether the initial court had jurisdiction over the claim. In
contrast, an honest analysis of whether a party "should" have previously
raised his claim seeks a more nuanced evaluation of the circumstances. A
court might decline to say a party should have brought a claim that was
hypothetically possible in the initial proceeding due to its attenuation
from the initial proceeding. In other words, all claims that should have
been raised, could have been raised; however, not all claims that could

133

See Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 771-73 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that any claim within

the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction also falls within the "should have been litigated" test).
134

For example, a plaintiff need not raise claims that should be brought against a defendant if

the plaintiff could not bring them due to a procedural or jurisdictional limitation.
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have been raised should have been raised. After all, claim preclusion is
designed to prevent parties from bringing claims that were captured in
the earlier proceeding in the interest of finality, while also balancing the
litigant's autonomy and day in court. Often the former interest is
stronger, but other times the latter should prevail. By building an element
of discretion ("should have") into the analysis for fictional consent claims,
decisionmakers can avoid the jarring impact of a "sharp corner." Such
discretion will permit claim preclusion to retain its potency where the
unraised claims fall within the doctrine's core focus, and also eliminate
the problem of fictional consent on unraised claims that are beyond claim
preclusion's intended scope.
2.

Introducing a Taxonomy for Determining Claim Preclusive Effect

The following taxonomy is designed to determine whether claim
preclusion bars fictional consent claims.135 It offers different standards for
applying claim preclusion to unraised claims based upon two factors: (1)
the breadth of jurisdiction available in the first proceeding, and (2) the
party facing preclusion's likelihood of awareness about the impact of their
actions in proceeding one. 136 These factors are inspired by the lessons
from bankruptcy, an environment where fictional consent claim
preclusion is particularly troublesome.137
The jurisdictional breadth factor aims to identify circumstances
where many, varied claims will be precluded if they are not raised.
Arbiters that may resolve many categories and types of claims would be

considered broad, while decisionmakers who are given focused and
limited jurisdictional mandates fall within the narrow category. What
constitutes "broad" and "narrow" jurisdiction may fall along a spectrum
rather than squarely within a category, yet the analysis should be

135

Courts evaluating claim preclusion of fictional consent claims can alternatively view this

taxonomy as creating an exception to the claim preclusion rules.
136

This taxonomy is intended to evaluate fictional consent environments and should be

completed in the abstract with regard to the overall system. The goal of this framework is not to
shield specific litigants facing claim preclusion, however sympathetic their individual situation may
be.
137

See Section II.C (explaining that, in bankruptcy, (1) the number of potential claims that could

arguably be raised is quite large due to broad jurisdiction; and (2) the individual litigants are
unlikely to recognize the extent to which they will be impacted by claim preclusion).
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relatively simple (if imperfect) to classify for purposes of this framework.
The analysis should focus on identifying whether claims that fall within
the decisionmaker's authority-meaning that they could be precluded if
a litigant does not raise them-are likely to ensnare unaware litigants. As

described above, a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is so broad that many
participants in a bankruptcy process are likely to misunderstand the full
scope of bankruptcy authority.
The litigant awareness factor138 seeks to identify systems where the
precluded party is at an information disadvantage and is less likely to
recognize the negative consequences of their inaction. Relatively aware
litigants are likely to (1) have direct, rather than constructive
representation by an attorney, 139 (2) actively engage in the initial
proceeding, and (3) have familiarity with the forum and its limits. In
contrast, unaware litigants may have an attenuated relationship with
attorneys advocating on behalf of their interests, are unlikely to know

about the breadth of the court's jurisdiction, and may be involved only
tangentially in the initial proceeding. Additionally, inherent qualities
about the forum, such as mechanisms that suggest claims will be
preserved, can contribute to an unaware litigant.140 Evaluating litigant
awareness will require the court to ask whether someone standing in the
litigant's shoes in this system would be aware-an objective analysisrather than whether the actual litigant had subjective knowledge.141

138

See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L.

REV. 265, 301 (2011) (discussing consent in the context of mass litigation settlements and
identifying "sophistication" of litigants as a relevant factor).
139

Constructive representation occurs when a party's interest is presumed to be represented by

an attorney that he did not select and may have limited influence to guide in the process. Some
examples include bankruptcy's unsecured creditors' committee, or counsel appointed to represent
members of a class action.
140

For example, in bankruptcy the code provides a mechanism by which debtors may preserve

claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B), however, courts are split on the specificity with which a debtor
must reserve claims to escape claim preclusion. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. C.U. Techs., Inc. (In re MAI

Systems), 178 B.R. 50, 55 (Bankr. D. Del. 1995); Guttman v. Martin (In re Railworks Corp.), 325
B.R. 709, 717 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005); Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc. v. APL Ltd. (In re Burlington
Motor Carriers, Inc.), No. CIV. A.99-157MMS, 1999 WL 1427683, at *11 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 1999);
Apparel Art Int'l v. Amertex Enters., 48 F.3d 576, 586 (1st Cir. 1995). This leads to uncertainty
among debtors who may have assumed that their claims were properly preserved, only to later
discover that they are subject to claim preclusion.
141

The irony of evaluating claim preclusion for fictional consent claims by engaging in a

hypothetical analysis of the litigant's position is not lost on the author. The challenge with this
approach is that inevitably some litigants who objectively should have raised their claim will not
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Once these two factors are identified, the proposed taxonomy
classifies litigation contexts and identifies how courts should treat
fictional-consent claim preclusion. One additional factor that is reflected
in the taxonomy's proposed standards is the presence of litigation
gamesmanship. Claim preclusion was designed, in part, to prevent
strategic litigation maneuvering. The taxonomy is designed to reduce the
negative consequences of claim preclusion by fictional consent while also
honoring the foundational concepts of claim preclusion. For this reason,
when the party raising a preclusion defense provides evidence that the
other party is taking strategic advantage of the process, then the policy
favoring finality should prevail and preclude the unraised claim.
The taxonomy can be illustrated as follows:

Broad Jurisdiction

Unaware

Litigant

No fictionat-consent claim
preclusion, unless evidence
of litigation gamesmanship

Narrow Jurisdiction

Fictional-consent claim
preclusion only for claims

that a litigant shoulc have
raised in initial proceeding

Aware

Litigants

Fictional Consent Claim

Fictional consent claim

preclusion only for claims
that a litigant should have

preclusion applies to all
claims that coild have been

raised in initial proceeding

raised in initial proceeding

Whether the claim should have been raised in the initial proceeding
turns on the same factors that form the framework: breadth of
jurisdiction and degree of litigant awareness. The court should consider
whether the party had "actual or imputed awareness" of a "real potential"
for claims against the other party, and whether the initial court offered

actually know the claim exists. This outcome, while unjust to the individually precluded party, is
better than either the majority approach taken by bankruptcy courts (resulting in over-preclusion)
or the minority approach (resulting in under-preclusion).
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"procedural mechanisms" through which the party could have effectively
pursued their claims.142
At times, the "should have been raised" standard will reach identical
outcomes as the "could have been raised" standard; other times, it will
not. By creating a limited equitable release valve whereby the court may
functionally evaluate the circumstances at issue in proceeding one, this
taxonomy reduces the primary due process problem of fictional consent
in claim preclusion, while also minimizing the threat to finality. 143 The
following analysis provides more detail and examples for each category.
a.

Category 1: Narrow Jurisdiction/Unaware Litigants

In systems where jurisdiction is broad and litigant awareness is
minimal, fictional-consent claim preclusion poses the most acute due
process threat. In such circumstances, claim preclusion should not apply
to unraised claims unless the party raising the claim preclusion defense
provides evidence that the unraised claim resulted from litigation
gamesmanship. Where the court sees that the party challenging
preclusion actually did know about their rights, and purposefully avoided
pursuing them, then the court can embrace the fiction of consent and
preclude the claim.144
The bankruptcy claim between SSE and Mobilecon falls cleanly
within this category. Bankruptcy courts have incredibly broad
jurisdictional authority, and the claim being precluded falls near the outer
edges of that authority. Additionally, the litigants (here, each an
unsecured creditor) are unlikely to be aware of critical facts about their
rights. This includes awareness that the bankruptcy court could hear their

142

This standard is also borrowed from decisions relating to bankruptcy. See Osherow v. Ernst

& Young, LLP (In re Intelogic Trace, Inc.), 200 F.3d 382, 388 (5th Cir. 2000).
143

Critics of this taxonomy may identify concerns with administrability or overcomplicating an

already difficult doctrine. Other scholars, however, have approached the preclusion problem with
similar balancing tests to conceptualize the parties' different interests. See, e.g., Clermont, supra
note 26, at 31-38 (identifying balancing factors in mathematical form). The problems at issue in
this Article are complicated, and meaningful efforts

to address those problems without

undermining the core finality purpose of fictional consent may require nuanced adjustments. From
my perspective, the solution is worth the cost.
144

For example, in Wingnet v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the second court noted that the

party challenging preclusion had initially brought his unraised claim before the bankruptcy court,

then dismissed it. 537 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2008). This evidence should overcome a presumption
against claim preclusion, because the party was plainly aware of the rights and made a decision,
however misguided, to stop pursuing the claim. Id.
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state law claim; awareness that the debtor would have rights that are tied
up in the claim; and awareness that those rights are addressed in a sale or
confirmation order. Finally, the representative nature of the bankruptcy
process suggests that the creditors may not be incentivized to hire counsel
to watch the case unfold. Unsecured creditors are rarely eligible for
recovery large enough to justify retaining counsel, and their interests are

presumed to be represented by the unsecured creditors committee.145
Even a prudent bankruptcy counsel could be completely unaware that the
creditor has a claim against another creditor. To realistically rule this out,
counsel would need to print a list of the creditor matrix-which can
include thousands of names that are constantly updated-and ask her
client whether the client has potential claims against anyone, then further
investigate any relationship to the debtor. In bankruptcy, where claimants
are jockeying to receive even a percentage of what they are owed, few
creditors would approve attorney's fees for such a fishing expedition.
b.

Category 2: Narrow Jurisdiction/Unaware Litigants

Where jurisdiction is narrow, but litigants are unaware, the second
court should give claim preclusive effect to unraised claims that should
have been raised in the initial proceeding. Because the first court's
jurisdiction is narrow, the universe of claims that maybe precluded is not
large and there is less risk that the precluded claims are beyond the
parties' anticipation. Relatedly, even though the parties are likely aware
of the potential claims that fall within the courts' jurisdiction, there may
be forum-specific representational challenges that may reduce their
ability to effectively assert their due process rights.146 When deciding

145

Recognizing the value of this representation and advocacy on behalf of unsecured creditors-

who otherwise have little leverage in a bankruptcy case-the Bankruptcy Code provides that the
estate must pay for reasonable compensation to the creditor's committee professionals. This
ensures that the Uniform Commercial Code's (UCC) representation is both professional and
meaningful. Similar to the status of class counsel in aggregate litigation, the UCC does not advocate
the interests of any one creditor, and the idea that they are "represented" in the traditional sense is
itself a fiction.
146

Conceptually, mass aggregation devices such as class actions and multidistrict litigations

(MDLs) may also fall within this category. While courts addressing class actions rely on "adequate
representation" of absent claimants to preclude unraised claims, it is uncertain that claim
preclusion on unraised claims can satisfy due process. See Basset, supra note 8 (arguing that due
process requires unnamed class members be given the right to opt-in for preclusion to apply in
representative litigation); Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REv. 171,
198 (2016) (same); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in
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whether the claim should have been raised, the court can look to
subjective factors surrounding the forum and process that led to the
imposition of fictional consent.
An example of this scenario involves a foreign defendant that faced
claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and later brought a second lawsuit
for against the same parties. 147 Claim preclusion should bar any unraised
consent claims at issue in proceeding two that would have been, in effect,
a defense to the Anti-Terrorism Act claims that were actually decided in
proceeding one. The foreign defendant should have raised those claims
so that the initial court could have evaluated the full scope of the
underlying situation. But the foreign defendant's unraised consent claims
against the same parties that involve the same transaction are
conceptually distinct from the underlying suit-for instance, a
defamation suit against the plaintiff for statements made about the

underlying incident-should not be precluded. The foreign defendant
was not deemed to have consented to all potential claims in the United
States and is exceedingly unlikely to understand the claim preclusive
effect of not appearing, consenting to jurisdiction, and raising any
possible claim. Under such circumstances, the court should look to
whether the claimant knew that their claims could be raised, and whether
the initial proceeding was a sufficient place to challenge them. If so,

finality concerns are not overcome by due process considerations and the
claim should be precluded. If not, the litigant has not effectively been

Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1561 (2004)
(explaining that "[t]he overwhelming inaction displayed by class members in the reported cases
suggests that a class member's failure to opt out should not readily be equated to an affirmative
consent to jurisdiction ...

[and] that apathy, not decision, is the basis for inaction"); Martin H.

Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, LitigantAutonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural
Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1612 (2007) (observing the due process limitations of the optin mechanism). The MDL plaintiff may face greater due process threats, as he did not benefit from
the court's review of certification requirements under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and did not consent to being consolidated for trial, to being represented by group
counsel, or (in some cases) to the specific terms of any settlement put before him. See Linda S.
Mullenix, PolicingMDL Non-Class Settlements: Empowering Judges Through the All Writs Act, 37
REV. LITIG. 129, 149 (2018) (comparing the due process protections of Rule 23 in class actions to
the absence thereof in MDLs); Christopher B. Mueller, Taking a Second Look at MDL Product

Liability Settlements: Somebody Needs to Do It, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 564-65 (2017). Precluding
unraised claims against the settling defendant under such circumstances suggests a fiction of
consent that I hope to explore in future work.
147

See supra note 41, for more discussion of the Act and its impact on foreign defendants.
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given a day in court in the first proceeding and should be permitted to
proceed.
c.

Category 3: Broad Jurisdiction/Aware Litigants

Courts should ask whether a claim "should have been raised" in
environments where jurisdiction is broad, but litigants are more aware of
the impact of their role in the initial proceeding. Such litigants are better
able to protect themselves against a claim preclusion minefield, but still
are challenged by a broad jurisdictional grant that corresponds with a
higher likelihood that unanticipated claims fall within the initial
proceeding. For this reason, the reviewing court must look to the
subjective circumstances of the individual claimant, including their
actions and knowledge and the specific connection between the initial
action and the precluded claim.
The claims brought by a bankruptcy debtor against one of its
creditors fall within this category. 148 As described above, bankruptcy

courts have incredibly broad jurisdiction, so it is conceivable that a party
would have less knowledge about whether a particular claim could be
heard. That concern is mitigated, to a degree, due to the likelihood that
the debtor is adequately represented, has superior knowledge about the
bankruptcy process in general and the case in particular. The reviewing
court must evaluate the circumstances in the initial case and decide
whether that claim should have been raised. 149

148

Other examples may include limited issue class actions that address just one portion of the

possible claim, or even a class action that abandons certain claims in the interest of certification.
See Edward F. Sherman, "Abandoned Claims" in Class Actions: Implications for Preclusion and
Adequacy of Counsel, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 483 (2011) (describing various instances where a class
would abandon or narrowly define class claims for purposes of certification and exploring the
preclusive effect of doing so). The claim being challenged is likely closely connected to the certified
claim (perhaps a claim for damages rather than equitable relief). Notwithstanding the claim's
similarity, the litigants are unlikely to be aware of the claim preclusive effect of proceeding one.
Individual unnamed class members are notoriously attenuated from a class action and may have
no meaningful connection to their purported counsel. There is also some risk that the litigant would
not even know that they were a class member.
149

One consideration, among many, is whether there were time constraints during the initial

proceeding. Pidcock v. Schwab (In re SII Liquidation Co.), No. 10-60702, 2016 WL 197570, at *22
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2016) (noting that, given the timing circumstances, "full litigation of a
breach of fiduciary claim was nearly impossible while preserving the sale").
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Category 4: Narrow Jurisdiction/Aware Litigants

Finally, in circumstances where jurisdiction is narrow, and litigants
are aware of the circumstances, claim preclusion should bar any unraised
claims that "could have been raised," meaning all claims that fall within
the court's jurisdiction. The strict application of claim preclusion under

such circumstances does not offend due process protections, because
there is little chance that the litigant did not receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard in the first proceeding. Absence of actual consent
does not require the court to ignore the strong support for finality and
give the litigant a second bite at the apple. In the takings context, for
example, the precedent that requires a party to bring her takings claim in
state court prior to seeking federal review may be procedurally
frustrating, but the scope of claims that could be impacted by fictional
consent are extremely narrow. Additionally, the funneling requirement
has a long history, and takings plaintiffs who hire an attorney that litigates
these disputes is certain to know about the need to seek relief in the state
court.
e.

Creating a "Sharp Corner" Alternative

The proposal outlined above is flexible by design, and while it would
permit courts to effectively balance fairness and finality concerns in
fictional consent scenarios, it could also result in less clarity and

predictability. If the imposition of rigid and clear standards is a
fundamental requirement for preserving claim preclusion doctrine, then
an alternative solution is to remove claim preclusion's reach to fictional
consent claims altogether. Claim preclusion doctrine is littered with
exceptions and carveouts in response to many complex litigation
scenarios. Imposing yet another limitation in a narrow category of
circumstances is unlikely to undermine the doctrine. In instances where
either party would have been asked to consent to jurisdiction, but consent

was never discussed because the claim was never raised, preclusion
should not apply. The benefit of this approach is that the concept and
underlying role of consent will be preserved. The cost, however, is that
more claims may survive than under the existing approach, and scheming
litigants could strategically withhold consent claims for a later time.
Though strategic litigation behavior is a real problem, claim preclusion is
not the only doctrine that defends against duplicative litigation. The
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following Section identifies additional checks that would guard against
(or at minimum, reduce the incentive for) strategic use of different courts.

B.

ProvidingAdditional Checks

Adjusting, or even removing, claim preclusion's application to
unraised claims in fictional consent scenarios is necessary to address the
current imbalance that inappropriately values finality to the detriment of
fairness.so That is not to say, however, that such adjustments will be
costless. Reducing the expansiveness of claim preclusion doctrine will
inevitably result in heightened litigation costs and uncertainty for
litigants by increasing the number of claims that may be raised in
subsequent litigation. The following concepts can help mitigate the
negatives of reducing claim preclusion's role in fictional consent systems
by disincentivizing opportunistic re-litigation and minimizing the

additional cost to parties.
1.

Judicial Estoppel

Judicial estoppel provides one check on repeat litigation where claim
preclusion does not apply. Judicial estoppel is a flexible equitable doctrine
that supplements preclusion by protecting the integrity of the judicial
process. 151 Cases applying this doctrine stop parties from taking
inconsistent positions in cases. 15 2 Judicial estoppel may mitigate some of

15o

This is in addition to other benefits that may come from collateral challenges, including

offering an independent check on the judicial approach taken in the underlying proceeding.

is See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51 (2001). The Supreme Court identified a
three-part test for judicial estoppel, including: (1) "a party's later position must be 'clearly
inconsistent' with its earlier position;" (2) whether the "party has succeeded in persuading a court
to accept that party's earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a
later proceeding would create 'the perception that either the first or second court was misled;"' and
(3) "whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage
or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped." Id.
152

See, e.g., Payless Wholesale Distribs. Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989 F.2d 570, 571 (1st

Cir. 1993) ("Payless, having obtained judicial relief on the representation that no claims existed, can
not [sic] now resurrect them and obtain relief on the opposite basis."); Hamilton v. State Farm Fire

& Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 784-85 (9th Cir. 2001); Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains),
179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir. 1999); Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, N.A., 978 F.2d 555, 557
(9th Cir. 1992); Oneida Motor Freight Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1988).
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the challenges and cost posed by multiple proceedings by adding a limit
to what could be argued in that proceeding. This limit would make it less
attractive for litigants to sit on their rights and later challenge an

undesirable determination.
Consider SSE's products liability claim against Mobilecon. If, in the

bankruptcy case, SSE had agreed in a 9019 settlement153 with debtor Mr.
Chips that devices containing Mr. Chips's microchip are not defective,
then SSE would be barred by arguing any contrary position in the later
state court proceeding. Under this hypothetical, judicial estoppel would
at minimum eliminate any recovery SSE would have against Mr. Chips
by way of the indemnification provision. 154
2.

Remedy Limitation Devices

Additionally, courts reviewing previously unraised claims may
impose remedy limitations on any eventual recovery.15 5 When claim
preclusion does not apply, the court must hear and decide the party's
claim, giving them a day in court and satisfying their due process rights.
But due process does not require that the plaintiff's recovery be paid in
full. Where a court observes that awarding payment could threaten
finality and encourage repeat litigation, they could deploy equitable
authority to either reduce or prevent recovery altogether. This serves the
dual purposes of minimizing cost to the defending party and decreasing
the incentive to pursue multiple proceedings.156

If judicial estoppel is unavailable, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, can also
supplement claim preclusion in cases where a party takes inconsistent positions-either in or out
&

of court-and the other party relies on that conduct to his detriment. See WRIGHT, MILLER

CooPER, supra note 17, § 4477; T. Leigh Anenson, From Theory to Practice: Analyzing Equitable
Estoppel Under a PluralisticModel ofLaw, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 633, 640 (2007) (outlining the
contours of equitable estoppel and its application to various scenarios).

13 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
154

It may in fact also prevent any recovery against Mobilecon, which would deter SSE from

bringing the suit in the first place. This deterrence serves the same purpose as claim preclusion.
1ss

Laches is an obvious idea, to the extent it can be deployed in fictional consent scenarios. See

Samuel L. Bray, A Little Bit ofLaches Goes a Long Way: Notes on Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc., 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1 (2014) (emphasizing the appropriate limitation on laches to
equitable claims).
156

Remedy-limitation provisions would provide similarly useful assistance in the context of

equitable mootness, a separate equitable doctrine under which courts decline to hear an appeal of
a bankruptcy matter that is substantially consummated in a way that cannot easily be unwound.
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Take, for example, the claim by SSE against Mobilecon that may
trigger indemnification obligations against the debtor. Due process
requires that the state court decline to give claim preclusive effect to the
unraised products liability claim. The state court should consider and
decide whether the Mobilecon is liable to SSE for violating the state
products liability statute. To protect the finality concerns that are strong
in the bankruptcy process, the state court's ruling in favor of SSE should

be reduced by the amount that Mobilecon could have recovered through
indemnification. This insulates the debtor from repeat litigation and does
not harm Mobilecon (the party raising claim preclusion). Any injustice

caused by delay is borne by SSE, the party who did not seek relief before
the bankruptcy court.

C.

Supplemental Solutions

The fictional consent taxonomy outlined above offers an effective
way to mitigate some of the most egregious claim preclusion outcomes.
In addition to adopting that framework, Congress and/or the judiciary

could institute modest measures designed to reduce the problems caused
by fictional consent. Each of these steps aims to increase the likelihood
that litigants would be aware of the claim preclusive effect of their
inaction, thereby reducing the unexpected sting that accompanies
preclusion.
1.

Increased Notice

One way to improve the conditions surrounding imposition of claim
preclusion by fictional consent is to increase notice to litigants. Various
environments already require notice of key proceedings affecting
litigants' rights, but critics highlight the inadequacy of such notice to
reflect the potential claim preclusive effect. 157 Making the notice more

robust would reduce instances where parties inadvertently abandon
claims. This could take a number of forms, including mandatory
language in bankruptcy plans and settlement agreements, or pre-hearing

Courts' ongoing reliance on equitable mootness to silence litigant appeals presents similar threats
to due process norms and jurisdictional requirements.
157

Well-founded criticism focuses on both content and delivery.
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notices that reflect the claim preclusive implications of the courts'
resolution.
Notice is only effective if it is read, and skeptics might observe the
possibility that increased notice would actually harm parties. For
example, if most notices are not reviewed by a party in a litigation
environment, then increasing the content of any individual notice will
not improve the litigants' position; however, the increased content will
disadvantage litigants that received the notice when a court is asking
whether claim preclusion should apply. To remedy this concern,
stakeholders should look to improve both content and delivery, meaning
taking steps to increase the likelihood that notice will be reviewed.
2.

Express Carve-Outs or Opt-In language

Another alternative remedial measure involves increasing the
practices that clearly stake out which claims are tied up in a proceeding
and which are not. Some litigation systems already have a tradition of
establishing boundaries for claims that should be expanded to other
systems. For example, bankruptcy plans of reorganization often expressly
carve out causes of action that will be reserved by the estate, and some
class actions expressly reserve claims that are not raised and indicate that
such claims should not be precluded.158 The United States Trustee, a
neutral watchdog agency that appears in bankruptcy cases, could assist
with evaluating whether plans of reorganization appropriately put

interested parties on notice and do not carve away attenuated claims
between creditors. 159
Relatedly, beyond bankruptcy there is an ongoing push to return
class actions to an opt-in regime. Commentators have observed the due
process benefits of imposing an opt-in mechanism,160 and one such
benefit would be avoiding the problem of fictional consent. Other

structures, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Age

158

See Sherman, supra note 148, at 503-04 (observing that such statements are persuasive, but

not binding on courts evaluating claim preclusion in a subsequent proceeding).
159 See Lindsey D. Simon, The Guardian Trustee in Bankruptcy Court and Beyond, 48 N.C. L.

REV. (forthcoming 2020) (describing the role and powers of the United States Trustee and its
potential to serve as a neutral check both in and outside of bankruptcy).
160

See supra note 146 (discussing opt-in classes).
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Discrimination in Employment Act, already adopt this approach.161
When considering supplemental safeguards, both courts and Congress
should consider other opportunities to implement elements of an opt-in
system.

CONCLUSION

By balancing the interests of fairness with those of finality, the
underlying justification for claim preclusion's bar on unraised claims is
apparent. Existing safeguards and exceptions to claim preclusion
doctrine already limit a number of circumstances where unraised claims
would prove particularly concerning to individual litigants' concerns. In
situations where claim preclusion rests solely on fictional consent,
however, there is no similar explanation for precluding unraised claims.
Fictional consent causes problems at the individual level by pulling
unaware litigants into the dragnet of preclusion. Fictional consent also
poses problems at a structural level, threatening the fundamental
concepts of jurisdiction and consent in favor of finality. Where legal
fictions cause more harm than they provide benefits, something has to
give. Moving to the proposed claim preclusion framework explained
above would represent a significant first step toward acknowledging and
fixing the problem of fictional consent.

161

See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018) ("No employee shall be a party

plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought."); Age Discrimination in Employment

Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2018) (providing that the ADEA "shall be enforced in accordance
with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in ...

[the Fair Labor Standards Act]").

